Brian M Downing
This series has considered a few scenarios of Saudi Arabia in 20 years or so: a liberalizing monarchy, internal turmoil and disintegration, a regional economic and military power, and conflict with Israel. A strong kingdom could try to expand its power in the Middle East and avenge past defeats. Israel would become as hard pressed as it was in the 50s and 60s.
Israel has a formidable military and support from the US. However, ambitious regional leaders and their vengeful populations may opt to beleaguer Israel – diplomatically, economically, and militarily. Arab leaders would be more successful with the help of a major power such as Russia. A jarring shift in alliances may be in the cards – one that would bring back the region’s power lineup in the Cold War.
Russian-Israeli ties today
The Soviet Union once staunchly backed Israel’s eneymies – Egypt, Syria, Libya, and Iraq. Its arms flowed into Arab countries and its advisors trained their armies. Things can change quickly in the region.
Russia and Israel today have surprisingly good ties. Israel buys Russian oil and awarded contracts to develop its promising oil/gas fields in the Mediterranean to Russian firms. Israel sells hi-tech to Russia, including drones and other military goods.
Israel wants Russia to press Iran into withdrawing its troops and proxies from Syria, leaving Hisbollah to wither on the vine. More ambitious Israeli goals might entail Russia reducing support to Iran itself, leaving Tehran with no significant allies and vulnerable to Sunni states.
Putin wants Israel’s help getting arms contracts with its anti-Iran partners in the Gulf. A pipeline running from the Mediterranean to the Gulf of Aqaba will send Russian crude into new markets. Arms and oil sales are key to the Russian economy and popular support for the regime.
Saudi-Israel ties today
Saudi Arabia and Israel were also once enemies. The kingdom backed the armies of surrounding states and funded Palestinian terrorist outfits for decades.
The rise of Iran changed that. The Khomeini government called for regional uprisings by Sunnis and Shia alike, but little came of it. The Iran-Iraq War (1980-88) deepened enmity but it was Iraq’s defeat in 2003 that brought greater concern in Riyadh. Despite all the troubles Saddam caused, he and his army were a check on Iranian power.
The Saudis brought the Sunni Gulf states into its anti-Iran league but even collectively they are no match for Iran. Crucially, Netanyahu has convinced the Trump administration to renew American pressure on Iran.
The scenario
Saudi Arabia becomes a major power. It has weakened Iran, industrialized the kingdom, established a economic co-prosperity sphere centered in Riyadh, subsidized Sunni states and armies, and made itself a populist-militaristic beacon to the Arab world and even Pakistan – a state with a large army and growing nuclear arsenal. Israel would be a natural target, Russia a natural ally.
Saudi incentives for realignment
An ambitious Mohammad bin Salman and a mobilized population, both eager for greater military prestige, will find several sources of support. Wahhabism, the official Saudi ideology, and Salafism, Wahhabism’s export version that Riyadh spreads throughout the region, is deeply hostile to the West and Israel. The present Saudi-Israeli-US alignment rests on shaky ideological ground.
Arab populations are upset with Israeli actions in the West Bank and Gaza. Their leaders do not speak out forcefully or change their policies – all the more reason for them to turn on Israel someday. Regional armies have all been defeated if not humiliated by Israel. They too will want honor and revenge.
American governments are intermittently critical of Saudi Arabia for its oppressive rule. While muted at present, criticism will almost certainly return someday with a new administration. Riyadh knows well that such reproaches will not come from Moscow. The Saudi princes were thwarted by Russian might in Syria but they know it could be valuable in dealing with domestic opposition and in regional objectives as well.
Russian incentives for realignment
Russia and Saudi Arabia already enjoy a modicum of cordiality. They cooperate on oil prices and the Saudis buy some Russian arms, including Kalashnikovs, BMP armor, and the S400 air defense system. Russia wants a firmer and more lucrative partnership, even if it entails weakening ties with Israel.
Russia doesn’t sell a great deal of oil to Israel and can deliver its crude through the Suez Canal instead of an Israeli pipeline. It can replace Israeli hi-tech with Chinese products without suffering greatly lowered quality. Moscow’s prize of course will be to become the chief arms seller to Saudi Arabia, the Emirates, Kuwait, Bahrain, Egypt, and Jordan.
Russian culture is as deeply anti-Semitic as Wahhabism. Pogroms were commonplace for centuries and oppression continued well into the Soviet years, if not beyond. Putin wrested control of national resources from Jewish businessmen in order to reestablish his state’s finances. He cannot feel comfortable as he watches IDF strikes on allies in Syria which he can only quietly object to. His predecessors in the Kremlin, Peter the Great and Stalin, never would have allowed Russia to be daunted by a small state.
A Russian-Saudi alignment would be a great strategic turn of events. It would strengthen Russia, weaken the US. The Russian economy would be flush with petrodollars. American industries would suffer and its worker would be angry – at least as much with Washington as with Moscow. American flags may come down on military bases throughout the Gulf. Russian and Chinese ones may go up.
© 2019 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to Susan Ganosellis.