Brian M Downing
The Maduro government is facing increasing, concerted opposition from within and without. Unemployment and emigration are high. Inflation has reached Weimar levels. Despite holding the world’s highest oil reserves, production has been falling for years. Today, North Dakota alone produces more oil than all of Venezuela.
In recent days, Juan Guaidó, president of the National Assembly, a branch of government marginalized by Maduro, proclaimed himself the rightful leader. The US, Britain, France, Germany, and other countries have backed him.
Attention is focused on the National Assembly and UN but the Venezuelan army will play the most important role in deciding the outcome. The armies of the US, neighboring countries, Russia, and Cuba have interests in the drama. Some may provide lines and cues; others may play important roles themselves.
Armies and reform
Armies are thought of as praetorian guards for kings and dictators, but they have a more nuanced history. Officers, especially those below the top echelon, tire of the corruption and ineptitude of powerholders and see commanding generals as loyal not to the nation, but to the regime and the emoluments it confers. They also see their careers stifled by cronyism.
In 1952, Colonel Nasser and the Free Officers Movement ousted the monarchy in Egypt. Officers of similar ranks did the same in Syria, Iraq, Nigeria, and several other countries. It scarcely needs noting that most such coups led to governments no less corrupt and inept than those of predecessors.
The Venezuelan army
Top generals and commanders of key units did not attain their positions by professional training or prestigious war service. They got where they are through allegiance to Maduro and his predecessor, Hugo Chavez. As opposition spreads though, even top generals may calculate Maduro cannot hold on and take steps to save themselves. Naturally, they will claim to be acting in the nation’s interest and in the spirit of its founding general, Simon Bolivar. Motives may be questionable but Maduro will nonetheless feel the ground beneath him giving way.
Hundreds of officers below the top are hostile to Maduro, and increasingly so. They see the country in a shambles and their careers blocked by Maduro’s fawning retinue. The hundreds of thousand in the rank and file, many of them conscripts, have regular meals and paychecks but barracks do not insulate them from the plight of hungry and despondent family members and fellow countrymen.
Opposition and rage have already been expressed. One group directed a bomb-laden drone toward Maduro as he spoke in public. When the device went off, soldiers scattered in disarray. Protecting the leader comes second. Maduro’s army may be as unwilling to uphold his rule as the Shah of Iran’s was in 1979.
A military attaché in Washington announced his support for Guaidó, the rival leader in the legislature. As courageous as that was, it isn’t as significant as thought. A handful of Syrian officers defected to the rebels a few years ago but Assad remains in power. The Syrian war might have gone differently had they brought their infantry and armor along with them.
A Venezuelan colonel standing at the head of a loyal regiment near Caracas is far more important than an attaché in Washington. The regiment could paralyze the state, rally more regiments to the opposition, and present the possibility of civil war. Maduro might look for a flight to Havana.
Foreign armies
The US wants regime change in Venezuela. The administration, eager to show force but largely inexperienced, might be contemplating overt intervention. That would be counterproductive. It would conjure popular hostility to the Colossus of the North’s historical meddling and shift the political calculus. Indeed, US military intervention would rally a significant number of people to the regime.
More indirect approaches might be underway. Venezuelan officers have had working relationships with American counterparts for decades. They train together, study in the same advanced schools, and learn of new technologies in professional seminars. The networks have almost certainly been used by the US to gauge resistance and willingness to act.
Neighboring countries bear the burden of the millions of people who’ve fled Venezuela and they too want Maduro out. Overt intervention from them is also unlikely but a threat alone would force Maduro to move troops to the borders, reducing his repressive capacity in the capital and aggravating discontent in the ranks.
Russia and Cuba are not simply looking on. Putin recently airlifted a contingent of private contractors – the same troops used in the Crimea, Ukraine, and Syria – into Caracas. Their numbers are not large. They cannot take on a widespread army revolt. Nor are they backed by Russian airpower. The contractors will likely serve as a reliable bodyguard detail for Maduro and as a strike force to quash suspect officers.
Cuba has long benefited from Venezuelan subsidies, especially in oil, and needs the largesse to continue. Cuban troops have deployed overseas in the past to protect sympathetic governments. Angola is a case in point. The Cuban government is in the Trump administration’s gunsights and feels that if Maduro falls, it will be next.
A deployment of Cuban troops, aside from a token force alongside the Russians, is unlikely. A larger deployment could find itself in a protracted bitter conflict and ultimately return home in failure, perhaps after suffering high casualties that would dismay the public.
Russia and Cuba might see Venezuela as a lost cause and strengthen ties to prevent the Trump administration from thinking Cuba can be next. Putin’s contractors may help with domestic surveillance and his ships may make more frequent visits.
© 2019 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to Susan Ganosellis.