Brian M Downing
The war in Syria has eased considerably. Rebel positions along the periphery remain but Assad controls most of the country. Two interesting events have taken place in recent weeks. Delegates from Sunni Gulf states, key backers of Syrian rebel groups, have visited Damascus, and today President Trump called for a quick pullout of US troops.
The two events are interrelated and could lead to a remarkable diplomatic feat. It could have been pulled off years ago before all the bloodletting had Assad been more farsighted and less confident.
Syria today
Years of vicious civil war and pitiless Russian airstrikes have left Syria in ruins. Aleppo and other major cities resemble Stalingrad in 1943 and Berlin two years later. Shia-Sunni hatred is high and will remain so for decades, all the more so if the economy is no better than the cityscapes. Damascus needs money to get the country back on its feet and mollify the public.
Options are few. Moscow will extend aid but its coffers aren’t vast and oil prices, upon which Russian finances depend, have fallen sharply. Beijing will help but Syria has little to offer compared to Central Asia, the Persian Gulf, and Africa. Furthermore, many countries are wary that Chinese aid contains a “debt trap” which requires forfeiture of vital national assets if loan payments are missed.
When protests began in Syrian cities and revolt loomed, Saudi emissaries urged Assad to break with Iran in exchange for Sunni support in the impending crisis. Assad rejected the offer, Sunni states poured in aid to rebel groups, and Syria was destroyed. Sunni emissaries in Damascus last November probably broached the same geopolitical shift away from Tehran.
The new overture
The affluent and ambitious Sunni states will provide copious amounts of reconstruction aid. They will also build a proposed pipeline connecting the Gulf to Syrian ports on the Mediterranean, though Israeli ports may also benefit. (Oddly enough, there’s an old pipeline bringing Iraqi oil to Haifa, but it’s been closed since 1948.) Syria, then, will be part of a Sunni economic sphere with an industrializing Saudi Arabia at the center.
Sphere membership will require a stiff fee: greatly reducing ties with Iran and Hisbollah. All IRGC troops must leave and Syria will no longer be a conduit for Iranian arms to Hisbollah. Iranian power prestige will suffer. The Syrian war has cost many lives and great sums of money. The payoff may be a kiss off.
The US will withdraw from Syria, ceding large amounts of territory back to Damascus, including rich agricultural lands along the Euphrates and key oil fields. The latter are not immense by world standards but are nonetheless important to Syria’s reconstruction. US troops have served to signal that lines of communication between Damascus and Tehran can be cut through military force and that Syria should break with its ally to the east.
Israel has long made it clear that it will not tolerate Iranian troops in Syria. IDF jets and missiles routinely strike Iranian and Hisbollah positions. Syria cannot stop them, Russia has shown no interest in doing so. With Iran out of adjacent land and Syria integrated into the Saudi sphere, Israeli security will benefit immensely. Syria, Egypt, and Jordan – Israel’s main enemies in several large wars – will no longer be hostile, at least in the foreseeable future.
Regional opposition
The arrangement makes a good deal of sense for Syria but opposition will arise. The coterie of Shia/Alawi politicians, generals, and business leaders who form the Syrian leadership will question the judiciousness of breaking with Iran and leaving Hisbollah to wither on the vine.
Saudi aid will strengthen a subjugated but hostile Sunni populace and eventually encourage another uprising. Being part of a Sunni economic sphere will one day marginalize Shia/Alawi enterprises. The present sectarian atmosphere after all is highly rancorous. The Saudis don’t want harmony with the Shia, they want to subjugate them.
Iran, fearing further isolation, will play upon the concerns of Syria’s ruling elite. They will feel the need to boost subsidies to them, probably immensely. This will of course mean less domestic spending and greater public resentment as well. This will not be entirely unwelcome in Riyadh, Jerusalem, and Washington. It will help weaken the Iranian government, bring turmoil and paralysis, and perhaps even break Iran into pieces.
© 2018 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to Susan Ganosellis.