Brian M Downing
The US-led campaign in Iraq booted out Saddam Hussein, disbanded his army, and set up elections. A frail democracy has been in place for over a decade. The position here is that Iraq is not fertile soil for democratic government. Sectarianism, factionalism, tribalism, and corruption pose serious obstacles, perhaps insurmountable ones.
Another obstacle comes from abroad. Iraq’s neighbors are governed by authoritarian princes, clerics, and generals. They are deeply divided on security matters but all oppose democracy. Two of them, Saudi Arabia and Iran, are positioned to at least weaken Iraqi democracy.
Democracy and regional discontent
Regional powers see democracy as a western intrusion on theologically-ordained governance. Democracy leads to self-indulgent populations, directionless change, moral decay, state paralysis, and separatism.
The proximity of even a reasonably successful democracy would undermine regional clerics, dynasts, and generals. Rationales for tight grips and iron fists would give way. Rulers would be more widely seen as privileged, corrupt, and incompetent cliques. Reformist movements would be emboldened and another Arab Spring wouldn’t be long in coming.
When democratic revolutions swept Europe in the 19th century, emperors, kings, and tsars banded together to hold up faltering cousins, especially in Austria and France. Today, ruling families in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the Emirates, and Kuwait – the Romanovs, Bourbons, and Habsburgs of our day – are in league to uphold their privileges. Iran too opposes democracy, but cooperation with Sunnis will not take place. What can the princes and mullahs do?
Overt intervention
Sunni powers could one day find Iraqi democracy so threatening that invasion is deemed essential to maintaining the status quo. This is unlikely though. Sunni armies lack the experience, professional officer corps, and logistical skills for such an undertaking. The Shia population would put up spirited resistance to invasion and occupation. Further, invasion could bring direct battle with larger and probably better-trained Iranian troops. Riyadh wants no part of that.
An Iranian invasion would probably not bring a robust conventional response from Sunni capitals. Unconventional support, especially to Sunnis in western Iraq would be quite strong and occupation would be costly and endless. Tehran must also realize that invasion would bring devastating US airstrikes – on troop positions in Iraq and on a slew of targets inside Iran, regardless of connection to the war.
Covert intervention
The Saudis and Iranians can seek to weaken Iraqi democracy by a time-honored method used in and out of the region – bribery. Where force of arms and soft power fail, transfers of money may work. Politicians and factions could be drawn into the sphere of Riyadh or Tehran, though the more clever of them would play off the two desperate powers.
Iran has a head start here. During the war with Iraq in the 80s, Tehran built up militias and political parties, some of which still enjoy its subsidies. Appalled by Saddam’s fall and Iran’s rise, Riyadh developed ties with embittered Sunnis in Anbar province. The Dulayim tribes, which straddle the Iraqi-Saudi border, give the Saudis the opportunity to exploit kinship ties and petrodollars.
The crown prince met recently with Muqtada al Sadr, the mercurial and ambitious Shia power holder. Not long thereafter, Sadr’s bands attacked an Iranian consulate. Sectarian loyalties may not be as solid as thought.
Iraqis may weary of their government’s factionalism, corruption, and incompetence. Saudi and Iranian rulers will point out Iraqi discontent to their subjects, then underscore legitimizing myths of the superiority of non-western, religiously sanctioned governance. And the Romanovs, Bourbons, and Habsburgs of our day will hold on to their power for a while longer.
© 2018 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who’s written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks as ever to Susan Ganosellis.