Brian M Downing
Arms sales are increasingly important in world affairs – to buyers and sellers alike. The US isn’t in lockstep with the Gulf monarchies against Iran because of oil imports. American imports from the Middle East have dwindled over the last two decades or so. The tilt is more due to the monarchies’ immense purchases of US arms. Without them, the US will lose export revenue and high-paying jobs. Politicians know this well and act accordingly, regardless of party affiliation. In return, the US gets influence and bases in the region. Many leaders and publics see this as attractive.
Putin is playing the arms game with Qatar situated in the center of the Persian Gulf, right next to important American military bases and not far from the Strait of Hormuz. This is highly attractive to him.
Air defenses
The importance of air power and air defenses has been clear since the allies crippled the Luftwaffe in WW2 and it was underscored repeatedly in more recent wars. In 1967 Israel surprised Egyptian and Syrian air forces on the ground and went on to defeat their unprotected ground forces in six days.
Six years later, Egypt and Syria, with Soviet guidance, put together a multi-layer air-defense system and launched a surprise attack of their own. Egyptian troops broke through Israeli positions on the eastern side of the Suez Canal. IDF casualties were high, politicians and generals were alarmed. In time, however, American and Israeli experts cracked Egyptian air defenses, reestablished air superiority, and turned the tide.
In both Gulf wars, the US had air supremacy and was able to strike Iraqi troop positions, Scud sites, and hidden armor with near impunity. Indeed before the first Gulf war, Saddam opted to shuttle many of his fighters to Iran rather than inevitably lose them. More recently, Israel has been able to defeat Syrian air defenses and strike with almost no losses. It did so as long ago as the 2007 strike on a suspected nuclear facility in Syria and as recently as last month on Iranian positions there.
The lesson for conventional warfare is clear: no air defenses, no win. In almost all the Gulf states, however, arms purchases have less to do with military power than with diplomatic leverage. Sellers know this and have motives of their own.
Russian arms and the Middle East
Putin uses the S-400 system to further national interests, especially in the Middle East. He’s selling the system to Turkey in order to deepen the divide between Ankara and NATO. He recently opted not to sell the system to Syria, saying the country had no need for it – this despite routine Israeli airstrikes and two American cruise missile strikes. A clear signal went to Iran: its troops will remain unprotected and its position in Syria should be rethought. Russia is proceeding with an S-400 sale to Iran, in part as a consolation prize for favoring Israel in Syria.
In the fall of 2017 Saudi Arabia agreed to purchase the S-400 – in part to defend against Houthi missiles and perhaps against Iranian ones in coming years, and also to help Putin see the advantages of loosening support for Iran and its friends. One friend is Qatar, the small but influential Gulf state that once managed to maintain good relations with the Muslim Brotherhood, the United States, and both Saudi Arabia and Iran. It was a remarkable diplomatic feat but Riyadh and its Gulf allies imposed a boycott a year ago.
Last week Moscow announced it was going ahead, despite Saudi objections, with an S-400 sale to Qatar. Saudi Arabia is issuing threats, but it’s unlikely to act militarily as Qatar is a veritable American fortress.
A Russian air-defense system in Qatar has considerable significance. It establishes Russian support for the maverick Gulf state as it faces isolation by Sunni powers. Saudi Arabia has long wanted Qatar’s ruling family ousted and even went so far as to instigate a coup in 1996. It failed. The boycott is the latest attempt to bring regime change.
Qatar, the third largest importer of arms in the world, is signaling that its military equipment need not come from the US and the West. The sale could begin a Russian military presence in the Gulf as the system will be set up and maintained by Russian personnel. Presently, Qatar is home to major US air and naval bases and to the regional CENTCOM headquarters.
Russia will be able to monitor military operations up and down the Gulf, including American ships from the moment they transit Hormuz and American aircraft as they lift off on sorties over Iraq and Syria. Russia could also at least give early warning to Iran if attacks from the US and Israel were underway. Though Moscow presently prizes ties with Jerusalem ahead of those with Tehran, priorities could change over the years.
Putin may be positioning himself to mediate between the Sunni and Shia powers – an unlikely role for a figure who in recent years has used force in the Crimea, eastern Ukraine, and Syria. However, he may be able to note that the sectarian conflict benefits outside powers far more than it does Gulf states and that Russia, in conjunction with China, a rising power and importer of oil from both sides, can better handle affairs.
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We are nearing the dizzying paradox of key American military installations in the Gulf covered by a Russian air-defense system a few miles away. Another paradox is that Russia is sidling with Qatar, a country with strong ties to the Muslim Brotherhood which recruited troops that battled the Soviet Union in Afghanistan and are now fighting Russia and its allies in Syria.
Copyright 2018 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who has written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks to Susan Ganosellis.