Brian M Downing
World attention is rightly fixed on the fighting in Libya, but events in Saudi Arabia slated for Friday, March 11th might well take precedent. Young Saudis are mobilizing for demonstrations calling for political reforms but the regime has warned against any such gatherings. A confrontation with immense geopolitical and economic import is nearing. Capitals and bourses are watching anxiously. The outcome is of course unclear, but a look at the dramatis personae and possible developments might be attempted.
Generational Conflict
Demonstrations in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and elsewhere have pitted educated young people eager for a say in their futures against aging if not decrepit regimes that denied them that say. It will be no different in Saudi Arabia where over half the population is under the age of thirty. But the generational conflict will resonate with politics and intrigues within the large Saud family.
The Saudi government, of course, is directed by the descendants of Abdul Aziz bin Saud, the great warrior-king who conquered much of the Arabian peninsula following the demise of the Ottoman Empire after World War One. Since his death in 1953, his kingdom has been ruled by a line of sons, as practice calls for the crown to pass down to younger sons.
Only on the last son’s death – there are still over ten of them – is it to pass on to the next generation, though a council formed in 2006 will shape future successions. King Abdullah is 87, Crown Prince Sultan is perhaps four years younger – a situation reminiscent of the Soviet politburo a generation ago.
Discontent abounds within the ranks of the old warrior-king’s grandchildren, many of whom bristle at being passed over for key positions in favor of their better connected but less capable cousins. Accordingly, public calls for change from Saudi youths will likely resonate with resentments within the younger princes – perhaps also within the princesses.
One of the younger men, Prince Bandar (the Crown Prince’s son and former ambassador to the United States), dropped from sight a year ago – the result of a failed palace intrigue according to some reports. Whatever response to the demonstrations is being planned, the elders will have to bear in mind the thinking of their offspring and also the power their offspring hold thanks to the positions they have been granted in the state and in the military as well.
Advisory Councils
In the 1990s the government constructed consultative bodies (Majlis-ash-Shura) in order to fend off pressures that emerged during the First Gulf War from both modern reformers and Wahhabist traditionalists. These councils are non-elective; members are appointed by the king. Nor do they have legislative powers; they are consultative only. The councils nonetheless express the views of tribal elders, professional associations, and client-patron networks.
Historically, timid councils have sometimes tossed aside the subordinate role their creators envisioned and turned themselves into ambitious assemblies. Edward I convened the Model Parliament to do his bidding; they became a powerful and enduring institution. Louis XVI likely regretted convening an Estates-General as he climbed the scaffold. The Soviet duma helped thwart a military coup and bring down communism.
Amid these extraordinary time, Saudi council members may well take sides with reformers, either out of practical or ideological concerns – perhaps to the extent of demanding legislative powers and turning the country into a constitutional monarchy. History seems to be on their side.
Sunni and Shia
Unlike events in Tunisia and Egypt, though as with events in Bahrain, the calls for change in Saudi Arabia have a Shia-versus-Sunni dimension and so the centuries-old schism will shape the movement and perhaps distort the regime’s perceptions of it. Saudi Arabia’s 28 million people are approximately 10-15% Shia. They complain of systematic prejudice against their faith and of discrimination in jobs and governmental favors. They are primarily found in the oil-producing Eastern Province.
As problematic as sectarianism is, it is worsened if not poisoned by geopolitics. Iran and Saudi Arabia have long vied for primacy in the Persian Gulf. The contest was reasonably non-threatening under the Shah but became volatile once he was ousted and a Shia theocracy came to power.
Ayatollah Khomeini called for Shia uprisings but found very little response, though in 1979 Saudi suppression of Ashura mourning rites led to bloody riots in a few eastern towns. The Saudis supported Saddam Hussein’s 1980 invasion of Iran and Saudi jets dueled with Iranian ones on more than one occasion. The Saudis play a key role in assembling a Sunni-Arab coalition aimed at countering Iran and pressing it to drop its nuclear weapons program.
Saudi leaders today almost certainly see events in Bahrain and impending ones in their own realm to be the work of Iran, especially its Revolutionary Guard Corps. Of course, the Shia do not need a foreign agent to apprise them of their plight or inspire hope of a better day, but the perception of the IRGC’s hand will be a critical part of shaping the Saudi response and may cause some of Abdullah’s advisors to recommend a firm response.
Options for Repression
Three armed forces are available to the king. The national army is commanded by senior princes but has a large number of conscripts, whose willingness to come down hard on their countrymen is uncertain – uncertain both to foreign observers and to royal advisors as well. Friday would be an inopportune time to receive bad news on this regard so caution may be in order.
The national guard comprises a number of tribal levies. This is in some respects the institutional legacy of Abdul Aziz’s tribal bands that conquered the land ninety years ago. The national guard is generally considered to be mainly a counterforce against any intrigue coming from the regular army. There are a few tribes who are hostile to the Saudi regime, but of course those forces are unlikely to be deployed.
Neither the army nor the national guard is built chiefly for internal security purposes; neither brought accolades during the First Gulf War or the uprising in Mecca in 1979.
The Interior Ministry maintains security troops. It is a professional force that performed remarkably well in quashing al Qaeda-Arabian Peninsula over the last ten years. Initial responses to terrorism were heavy-handed and counterproductive. The public resented the harsh methods and al Qaeda throve on public resentments.
When less harsh methods were adopted in 1999, public support plummeted and al Qaeda-Arabian Peninsula was effectively driven out of the realm and into the wastelands of Yemen. It might be significant that the shift away from harsh methods was done on the orders of Abdullah, the present-day king. He is ailing but perhaps still aware of the counterproductive nature of his predecessor’s brutal methods.
Abdullah’s defeat of domestic terrorism may be instructive in another regard. Al Qaeda-Arabian Peninsula made the blunder of calling for insurrection against the House of Saud, which, at least back in 1999, was not widely loathed. That is likely still the case with most of the people as the government has been generous though not necessarily equitable with the petro-wealth.
An ill-advised crackdown, however, could easily and irreparably change that and make the transition to constitutional monarchy longer and more painful than it needs to be.
©2011