Brian M Downing
On taking the reins of power in January 2009, the Obama administration wanted to be rid of the Iraq war which its predecessor elected to begin six years earlier. The new and reasonably democratically-elected government in Baghdad had already ordered US troops out by the end of 2011, and the US administration readily complied. It even presented the departure to the American people as its own policy – fulfillment of a campaign promise – not an ejection.
The US was looking inward. Unemployment was high, the recovery weak. Abroad, Washington wanted to shift emphasis from the Middle East to East Asia where Chinese power was on the rise.
The Islamic State offensive, however, forced the US to re-enter Iraq, with advisers and air power. Generals and politicians aremspeaking publicly of deploying ground troops there once more. The literary world calls this foreshadowing. The return to Iraq has been driven by more than the Islamic State. Partisan politics, public opinion, and wide-ranging geopolitics have also played significant roles. The US presence in the Gulf region is as strong as ever and unlikely to recede in coming years.
Partisan politics
The Obama administration has been blamed by opportunistic conservatives and disenchanted independents for abandoning Iraq and allowing IS to seize large parts of it. The argument is dubious but it has enjoyed considerable traction. Obama’s support plunged below 40% just before the November elections.
As noted, the US was ordered to leave prior to Obama’s taking office. The Shi’ites, despite pressure from both the Bush and Obama administrations, were unwilling to forget the decades of Sunni misrule and bring their sectarian adversaries into the political process. This unwillingness has intensified sectarian hatred and made some Sunnis willing to support IS.
Had US troops remained, the Shi’ites would have been no less intransigent and the Sunnis would have resumed their insurgency against the meddlesome invaders who overthrew their rule and delivered the nation into the hands of – in their view here – Shi’ite apostates and Persian enemies.
The Sunni insurgents would have collaborated once more with al-Qaeda, as they did in the early years of the insurgency. US troops would be under relentless attacks and the Iraqi army would be all the more inert as GIs assumed the burden of fighting insurgent and IS fighters.
Nonetheless, the critique has caused trouble for the administration. It could not counter with arguments in Washington, only with actions in Iraq.
The American public
Willingness for military involvement in the world has come and gone over the last century, from the bitterness of 1918 to the thrill of global mastery after World War II, to the disillusionment with Vietnam, to the wrath following the 2001 attacks.
In recent years, the public was pleased to be out of Iraq. Only two years ago, congress, the public, and the Pentagon were reluctant to bomb Syria. However, the Islamic State’s pitiless killings of locals, grisly executions of western hostages, and onslaught into the lands of Kurdish allies brought sudden change.
Support for airstrikes on IS is strong: 76% support the campaign and 21% oppose it. Support for ground troops in Iraq is lower: 45% support it and 53% oppose it. However, if IS were to attack the US embassy in Baghdad – hardly a high hurdle given its many years of attacking Shi’ite targets in the capital – support for ground troops climbs to 72% and opposition falls to 27%.
The myth of the need for American might in the world has made a remarkable recovery. Indeed, it’s stronger than the president would want it to be. He may be relieved, however, that his approval rating has risen since the bombs began to fall in Iraq and Syria.
Israel
Allies are pleased to see the myth thriving once more. Many Christian and Jewish people are eager to keep America an active power in the Middle East. They are alarmed by periodic American disillusionment with foreign involvement as it seems to augur poorly for Israeli security. Diplomatic, financial, and military support may suffer, emboldening surrounding powers.
The American presence in the Persian Gulf is especially sensitive as these supporters have pressed repeatedly for US airstrikes on Iranian nuclear facilities, reaching a peak in early 2012. These supporters, it scarcely bears noting, have considerable support in congress and ancillary organizations in Washington.
Saudi Arabia and the Sunni monarchies
The Islamic State, by sweeping into Iraq at the expense of the national army, has called into question the fighting abilities of Middle Eastern armies. They are lavishly equipped with foreign arms and have been laboriously trained by contractors, but they are plagued by the same problems of nepotism, corruption, tribalism, and sectarianism that wracked the Iraqi army and led to its disintegration in the north. And the qualms over regional armies are no less strong in regard to their navies and air forces.
The Sunni powers had been distancing themselves from the US over its support for democracy in the region and diplomacy with Iran. But they are concerned over their ability to defend themselves and see no help from Russia or China – neither of whom is willing or able to project power into the Gulf. The US is the only available defender.
China
Yes, the US wishes to shift its strategic priorities to East Asia. However, that has never meant significant reduction of its presence in the Gulf. The US has not reduced its profile in Kuwait, the Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, or Oman. It maintains at least one aircraft carrier group inside the Gulf at all times. In recent years the presence in Saudi Arabia, reportedly terminated a decade ago, has quietly resurfaced.
This continuing presence is a reminder to countries which depend on Persian Gulf oil – China above all – that in the event of war, unlikely as that may be, their oil will have to pass through waters dominated by the American navy. Even China’s most ambitious admirals and security thinkers know this will be the case for many years.
Brian M Downing is a political-military analyst, author of The Military Revolution and Political Change and The Paths of Glory: Social Change in America from the Great War to Vietnam. he is and co-author with Danny Rittman of The Samson Heuristic. He can be reached at brianmdowning@gmail.com.
Copyright 2014 Brian M Downing