Brian M Downing
China and Russia have put aside past conflicts and begun a portentous aligment. Combined, they have formidable economic and military power – enough to control most of the Eurasian land mass. Such control has been a dream of geostrategists since Halford Mackinder outlined his “heartland” thesis a century ago.
No alignment is without tensions and susceptibility to disunity and conflict. The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact seemed to threaten much of the world but the Third Reich had plans for conquering and colonizing the Soviet Union. The US-Soviet alignment didn’t last much after past the fall of Berlin. Even the western partners in the anti-Nazi coalition had deep disagreements over war strategy, colonies, and the postwar world.
The Sino-Russian partnership is no exception. It too contains tensions and conflicting ambitions. Many will probably be more obvious in coming years and decades.
Distribution of wealth
A central aspect of the partnership is the exploitation of trans-Ural and Central Asian resources. China has the engineering firms, technology, and capital to tap those resources and export them to industries on its coast. Russia is not devoid of engineering and technological skills but they are inferior to China’s, and capital is much more plentiful in Chinese banks than in Russian ones.
China is better positioned to reap the benefits of trans-Ural and Central Asian wealth.Given its investments and risks, China will see this as fair and obviously so. Russia, however, will feel slighted. Perceptions will be shaped by one country’s sense of inevitable ascendance and the other’s concerns of a recurrence of marginalization by an opportunistic power.
Chinese hegemony
Chinese firms will manage the mines, lumber operations, pipelines, and rail lines. The engineers, managers, and skilled workers will become increasingly noticeable in daily life. Mostly men, they will socialize with and marry local women. This is already underway in the Russian Far East, much to the consternation of local men.
Housing and entertainment will arise with the Chinese in mind, not the Russians or Central Asians. In some places, the Chinese population will become a majority. The Chinese will be calling the shots, as the British did in India, the French in the Maghreb, and the Americans in many other parts of the world. Vast parts of the Eurasian land mass will be in a Chinese sphere of influence and Russia’s Near Abroad – countries that were once part of the Russian Empire – will look increasingly to Beijing.
Rising Islamism
Russia and China both face the wrath of Islamist militants: Russia for oppression in the Caucasus region and bombing campaign in Syria, China for its heavy-handedness with the Uighur population in Xinjiang province. ISIL bands are establishing themselves in parts of Afghanistan and promising a war of vengeance against Russia. Thousands of Uighurs have left Xinjiang to serve with ISIL and al Qaeda in the Middle East and Afghanistan.
Central Asia is already experiencing militant ferment. As traditional societies undergo rapid modernization by the introduction of foreign capital and personnel, this ferment will spread. Militant bands will benefit from the influx of disaffected people from town and country alike.
Leaders in Beijing and Moscow are not disposed to soft policies toward militants. Russia leveled the capital of Chechnya, and China is stifling Ughiur culture and imposing its own. If such measures are introduced in Central Asia, Islamist militancy will do well.
Beijing and Moscow may not quarrel over soft policies, but they may well disagree vehemently over who is responsible for rising militancy. Was it Russian-backed governments that are corrupt and authoritarian, or Chinese personnel who are increasingly numerous and insensitive toward locals? And who will bear the burden of countering militancy? Whose money and whose troops?
Financial dependence
China is rising, Russia isn’t. The Russian economy is sluggish. This is not only because of the importance of oil revenue, but because of the government’s approach to major businesses. Corporations are rivals to state power that, in Putin’s estimation, had to be appropriated and turned into cash cows for his state. The result is uncertainty among business people and accelerated capital flight.
China, on the other hand, has always controlled major businesses and never had to bring them to heel. Chinese businesses look upon the state as a capable board of directors that has guided the country’s economy and reestablished national greatness. China’s growth has greatly exceeded Russia’s in the last decade and will continue to do so.
In coming years Russia will be in need of foreign investment. It will not be forthcoming from the US, of course, and EU countries will be wary. China may be Russia’s best choice. It will be positioned to take advantage of Russia’s dependency and offer capital in exchange for increasing control of trans-Ural resources, oil discounts, and the lead on foreign policy matters.
This may gravely weaken Putin’s image as defender of Russia’s honor and open the way for an ultra-nationalist opposition. Fears of decline, absorption, and betrayal will circulate. So will a belated realization that trans-Ural Russia is indefensible. Such an opposition will find many followers today in the country’s Far East provinces. This of course would be paradoxical but as Chinese power increases vis-a-vis Russia’s, paradoxes will abound. So will antagonisms.
Copyright 2018 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who has written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks to Susan Ganosellis.