Brian M Downing
After months of denunciations, maneuvers, and boycotts, the Saudis are expressing doubts about its march to war with Iran. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, once a hawk, is said to favor ending the proxy war in Yemen. He is also thought to be seeking the good offices of Iraqi prime minister Abadi to help ratchet down tensions with Iran.
In years past such a shift would have stemmed from moderating pressure out of the White House. That’s unlikely today. The present administration has been harshly critical of Iran and taken steps for action against it in both Yemen and Syria.
It’s uncertain if the prince’s move toward detente in the Gulf will lead anywhere. Minds can change swiftly in Riyadh much as they do in Washington. So can leaders. But why is the crown prince stepping back from aggressive stances?
Many people inside the Kingdom are less taken by sectarian passions than others and may look worriedly to a long, expensive conflict with Iran. It will place unprecedented demands on a population unaccustomed to hardship. This in turn may lead to popular demands for participation in government, as it has since Antiquity when the Romans bestowed citizenship on subject-soldiers.
Oil revenues are expected to remain low in the foreseeable future. The Saudis drove down oil prices in years past to lower US oil production, but American producers have cut costs markedly and rig counts are rising quickly. In the eastern Mediterranean, oil and gas production is rising, reducing demand from the EU. This isn’t an opportune time to assume the costs of war.
The Saudi army and those of its Sunni allies are neither battle-tested nor battle-ready. Nepotism and laxity pervade the ranks. The Iranian army is much larger and while hardly impressive in Syria, it does have a measure of combat experience. As unlikely as a major ground war between Iran and Saudi Arabia is, it would not go well for the Saudis and their regional allies, especially without the certainty of support from the United States. (More on this anon.)
Riyadh must fear a fifth column. Some eleven percent of the population is Shia, most of it dwelling in oil-producing areas in the east and along the Yemeni frontier. Resistance will grow if a war emerges and place strains on the government’s repressive capacity.
A sectarian war will further fuse religious and martial passions. Some of this will be channeled into national armies and proxy forces, but some will bring a recruitment boon for ISIL and al Qaeda. This could be especially true after the war as fighters returns, victorious or not.
The recent Temple Mount crisis angered many Saudis. Cooperation with Israel against Iran brings the risk of energizing pious subjects in the Kingdom. This will be all the more so if the Israeli government shows continued disrespect for Muslim holy sites and the Palestinian people – highly probable with a Likud government.
Foreign pressures play a role. With the 2015 nuclear deal in place, the European Union sees Iran as a thriving market. The Saudis do not want to irk the EU and have it defend Iran diplomatically. Chinese pressure may be more important. Beijing buys immense quantities from both Iran and Saudi Arabia, replacing the West as chief consumers. Sectarian squabbles based on events in centuries past must not interfere with China’s march toward global power and Beijing is undoubtedly using its leverage on Riyadh and Tehran.
The Saudis may be looking on events in the United States with dismay. The Trump administration seemed a staunch ally when the Saudis inked a large arms purchase agreement last spring. Today, however, the administration is at sea, incapable of focusing on matters at home or abroad. Further, the country is beset by domestic strife which will grow in scope and intensity, and limit its ability to act coherently in the world.
Copyright 2017 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who has written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs.