Brian M Downing
The conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran did not begin by the happenstance of a border dispute or the sinking of a passenger liner. It came about by international diplomacy as surely as a multinational trade agreement. As murderous and chaotic as wars are, they have a logic to them. Participants have goals in mind ranging from liberation of an oppressed people to control of land and wealth.
Actors in the emerging Sunni-Shia conflict have goals too. They’re just obscured by claims of danger and the preliminary maneuvers. Statesmen in Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Israel have concrete geopolitical and economic aims. The US will gain from arms sales.
Even the aims of allies may not be the same and will make for disagreements as the conflict unfolds, especially if it nears an end. Britain and France agreed on carving up the Middle East after World War One, but the United States and Soviet Union had a portentous falling out after World War Two.
Saudi Arabia
The Saudi princes’ hostility toward Shiism and Iran forms the basis of the Saudi, Israeli, and American alignment. Khomeini’s call for revolution (1979) and the rise of Shia government in Iraq (2003) caused great concern inside the Kingdom. Saudi Arabia wants Iran badly weakened or even broken apart.
The Saudis want to block land communication between Syria and Lebanon in the west and Iran in the east. This can be done by American and Saudi special forces and airstrikes, perhaps augmented by Jordanian and Egyptian troops. Alternately, Syrian militias supported by the US can form a statelet along the roadways connecting Damascus and Tehran.
Protracted conflict with Iranian-backed proxies in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen will cause financial woes in Iran. All the more so if Iranian troops suffer years of casualties on those fronts. More optimistic if unrealistic scenarios see growing separatist movements. What’s happened in Iraq, Libya, and Syria could happen in the heartland of Shiism.
Success in the conflict will bring Saudi hegemony in the Middle East and immense power prestige for the House of Saud. Succession from the aged sons of Abdul Aziz to a younger clique will go more smoothly.
Iran
Lacking the military and financial resources of the Sunni allies, the US, and Israel, and with only a fragmented Syria and a handful of militias on its side, Iran is on the backfoot. It faces daunting challenges in supporting allies in Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen. Deploying more troops into foreign theaters must be done sparingly. Its aims must be more modest than Saudi Arabia’s.
Iran may opt to encourage the Kingdom’s large Shia population to conduct insurgencies or at least bombing campaigns. The aim here will be to convince Riyadh that the war is too costly to pursue and relent.
Iranian security bureaus may see the country’s survival at stake and opt to renew its nuclear weapons program. This, however, would almost certainly trigger American and Israeli attacks on centrifuge sites such as Natanz and Fordo. In any event a nuclear weapon would only serve a purpose in deterring or punishing a large-scale invasion, which is highly unlikely.
Israel
Having the Sunni and Shia powers engaged in a long, internecine conflict with each other brings enormous strategic benefits to Israel. With Syria, Iraq, and Libya broken apart and unlikely ever to reemerge as unified countries, Israeli security has never been stronger.
The Palestinian question once unified the Arab world. No more. Eyes are on the sectarian conflict. Israeli settlements can continue and even accelerate. Statements out of the Israeli government suggest military action against Hisbollah is on the horizon.
Cooperation against Iran brings the opportunity for the sale of intelligence and weapons, and a chance to engage in commerce with Sunni states.
Israel and Saudi Arabia probably do not agree on an end game for Iran. The Saudis want Iran gravely weakened or even broken into pieces – Kurdish, Baloch, Azeri, Arab, and Persian regions. This would leave Saudi Arabia as masters of the Middle East, with Egypt, Jordan, and a slew of beholden Sunni militias in Yemen, Syria, and Iraq. A tremendous boon for Saudis, an ominous turn for Israelis
A gravely damaged Iran would undermine the Israeli-Sunni partnership which is based on little more than common hostility toward Iran. Saudi princes and their vassals might readily recall past grievances with a state they once deemed the Lesser Satan. Wahhabism combined with the intoxication of victory would be dangerous – something akin to ISIL at its zenith.
From the Israeli perspective, the Sunni-Shia war should wear on, draining the resources of both powers, building discontent on the streets of both Tehran and Riyadh, perhaps to destabilizing levels.
The war may one day be seen as a testament to the skillful diplomacy of Israel but more importantly to the religious hatreds and geopolitical myopia of Saudi Arabia and its fellow monarchies.
Copyright 2017 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who has written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks to Susan Ganosellis.