The rise of West Kurdistan

Brian M Downing 

History has not been kind to the Kurds. Living in what is now (or was) Syria, Iraq, Turkey, and Iran, they have fought to retain their language and customs while subjugated by Safavid, Ottoman, British, French, and other empires. The breakup of Syria and Iraq brings opportunity for autonomy or even independence – a distinction of diminishing importance. The Kurdish region of Iraq is all but independent. Kurdish Syria, sometimes called West Kurdistan, may soon follow.

Syrian Kurds have ably shown their fighting ability in recent years, handing the seemingly unstoppable ISIL a stunning and costly defeat at Kobane and grinding it down village after village ever since. Today Kurdish militias compose important parts of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) which are poised to take the ISIL capital of Raqqa in central Syria and detach much of eastern Syria from Damascus’s control.

The Kurds’ military effectiveness has caught the attention of regional and world powers. Saudi Arabia, Israel, and the United States have recently created an Entente whose chief purpose is to weaken Iranian-Shia power throughout the region. The Kurds of Syria figure highly in the Entente’s plans.

Israel

Kurdish peoples have long benefited from strategic partnership with Israel. When Iraq was a powerful enemy, Israel sent weapons and trainers to Kurdish guerrillas operating in the north. With the destruction of Iraqi power in Gulf War One, and the rise of Iranian-backed Hisbollah into a political-military force, Israeli support extended into Iran’s northwest. A low-level insurgency is underway.

Israel wants a strong regional ally, preferably one not given to the religious fervors wracking the Middle East. Syrian Kurds, having suffered under extremism, fit the description. Syrian Kurds can counter any effort by Damascus to reestablish control over all Syria which would enable it to become a significant ally of Iran and a renewed threat to Israel.

Saudi Arabia

Israel’s concern with Iranian-Shia power is shared in Riyadh. Geopolitical interest there intermingles freely with sectarian enmity and also with recognition of its own army’s limitations, lavishly equipped though it is.

Over the years the House of Saud has done well in getting other countries to defend its domain. A US coalition defeated Saddam in 1991, while Saudi troops played only a minor role – and did not perform especially well in it. Though deeply concerned with the Shia of North Yemen, Saudi troops serve only as security guards in towns well behind the fighting. Riyadh wants the Kurds as allies against the Shia. Its strategic vision may include strengthening the Kurdish insurgency in Iran.

The Saudis can offer the Kurds financial support for arms and development programs. Looking further ahead, it can also offer export routes to world markets for whatever Syrian oil the Kurds or their SDF allies control. The same can be said of the considerable oil resources of Iraqi Kurdistan which presently relies on Turkey to reach export terminals on the Mediterranean. A pipeline may one day run south into Saudi infrastructure, or into Jordan then west to terminals in Israel. Fanciful perhaps, but economic cooperation is high on the agenda of Entente partners, including junior ones in Jordan and Egypt.

Success in Syria will confer prestige and legitimacy on the royal family. This will be important in coming years as power shifts from the aged and infirm sons of Abdul Aziz to their own sons – strictly speaking, to a privileged clique in the younger Saud generation.

The United States

Washington has accepted the need to counter Iranian-Shia power and will solidify its position in the volatile expanses of eastern Syria. Further, it will help build a defensible Kurdish region and an Arab one contiguous to and hopefully aligned with it.

The US has already provided arms, trainers, artillery and air support, and money to the Kurds and Arabs of the SDF – a policy begun far back in the Obama administration. How well either administration has envisioned an end point to the involvement remains to be seen. Nor are advantages to American national security readily discernible.

Kurdistan

Having its own army, flag, constitution, and pipeline, Kurdistan is autonomous of Baghdad and moving toward independence. Its peshmerga halted and rolled back the ISIL offensive of 2014 and have taken up important blocking positions in the Mosul campaign. Along the way it has seized valuable lands, some of which have large oil reserves. Kurdistan will hold some territory and use other parts as bargaining chips with Baghdad.

A political integration of Kurdistan with Syrian Kurdistan, or West Kurdistan, is not as natural as it might seem. The Kurdish people are divided along political and tribal lines and are unlikely to form a substantive political union, despite common dangers and the urging of foreign supporters. A quarrelsome and perhaps feuding confederation is the most that will come of it.

Turkey

President Erdogan is undoubtedly eyeing all this with ire. The prospect of a West Kurdistan under the aegis of the United States, Israel, and Saudi Arabia presents the unsettling prospect of a heightened insurgency in southeastern Turkey, home to many millions of restive Kurds. Erdogan has recently irritated the US by strengthening trade with Russia and cooperating with it in setting up statelets in northern Syria to keep watch on the Kurds.

Turkey’s options are limited and problematic. A ground incursion into West Kurdistan would bring a long, ever-deepening war. Fighting on their own lands, the Kurds could inflict heavy casualties on the Turkish army, bringing greater discontent to the officer corps and large parts of the Turkish population.

A second option would be to close off the Incirlik airbase to American and NATO forces. The US relies on it a great deal for air support and logistics in Syria. Closing Incirlik, however, risks a complete break with Washington. Erdogan is not likely to want this, as it might further anger his army and bring closer military and economic ties among the US, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan, including the building or reopening of large US bases. Turkey must remain important to the US.

Ankara might be better served by maintaining good relations with Washington and insisting that America prevail upon their allies in West Kurdistan to refrain from cooperating with their brethren in Turkey. The quarrelsome and feuding nature of West Kurdistan and Kurdistan may present Turkey with opportunities in the future.

Copyright 2017 Brian M Downing

Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who has written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs.