Brian M Downing
Last week the US fired a salvo of cruise missiles into a Syrian airbase in response to Damascus’s use of nerve gas on Idlib civilians. The attack was measured, not an intemperate lashing-out as many feared would come from the new president. President Trump forewarned Moscow, who in turn notified Damascus, and casualties were low.
Putin nonetheless criticized the strike and has convened his security team. Putin’s considerable popularity at home is based in large part on restoring his nation’s prestige in the world. He will respond to the American strike. But where and how?
Syria
The most obvious place to respond would be Syria. It would signal Washington and hearten Damascus. Russia has several warships in the 
eastern Mediterranean that could fire cruise missiles into rebel positions. Alternately, the missiles could be transferred to the Syrian military at a public ceremony. The symmetry will have obvious attractions.
Russia could bolster its Syrian presence, if only by a token force of another fighter squadron or air defense unit. They might even be positioned on the airbase that was struck last week.
American planes routinely patrol Syrian skies and strike al Qaeda and ISIL positions. Russia may harass them with radar locks from fighters or ground systems. Buzzing is done in the Baltic and elsewhere, and it could happen over Syria. Russian aircraft could “accidentally” strike positions near Raqqa and Manjib where American troops are deployed.
The Syrian government could continue attacks on civilian positions in Idlib. The use of chemical weapons would surely elicit a swift, forceful response, but it’s unclear what the use of barrel bombs and conventional bombs would bring. They’ve been dropped onto civilian targets for years, with horrid results, and no material response from Washington.
Ukraine
Putin’s effort to detach the eastern Ukraine has been underway for years now. Fighting has picked up in recent weeks. It might pick up even more. Overt Russian intervention could break the Ukrainian forces and open the path to annexation, as with the Crimea in 2013.
Intervention could take place in the east or possibly to the west. Russian troops could mass near Kursk and the Belarus-Ukraine border which are a hundred miles or so from Kiev. The Ukrainian army, corrupt and poorly organized though spirited, would be hard-pressed to counter Russian troops. Foreign intervention is unlikely. Match point in the Ukraine may be at hand.
Libya
Warlord and former CIA asset Khalifa Haftar has carved out a solid portion of eastern and central parts of Libya, including a good deal of its oilfields, pipelines, and export terminals. More recently he boarded the Russian aircraft carrier Kuznetsov and held a videoconference with Moscow’s defense minister. Sharing political affinities, the general is becoming a Kremlin ally.
Haftar may be encouraged to assert control over more of the chaotic country, parts of which are backed by the US and other western countries. Putin may calculate that western publics will grow weary of commitments in the region.
Afghanistan
Largely unnoticed, Russia and the United States have common interests here. The American commitment is increasing as the overstretched Afghan army is about to face a multi-prong Taliban offensive. More GIs are returning, more equipment too.
There are two supply routes, a southern one through Pakistan, and a northern one that winds from Latvia through Russia and its client states, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, before entering northern Afghanistan. Putin is capable of closing the northern supply route at his convenience, leaving the US in the hands of duplicitous and extortionate Pakistani generals.
Any closing would probably be brief. Putin wants to convey his displeasure and American dependency, not aid the rise of Islamist militancy along his periphery.
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While there’s potential for dangerous escalation over Syria, there’s also reason for Russian restraint. Putin will not want to deepen and lengthen the Syrian war. Escalation can be matched, not only by the United States, but also by Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the Emirates, and other Sunni powers whose publics, if not their leaders, are angered by the Idlib atrocity.
This would prove expensive for all powers – Russia among the foremost. Further, it would strengthen ties between the US and the Sunni powers. Russian (and Chinese) strategic ambitions want to weaken those ties, become the region’s principal source of arms, and one day fly their flags over military bases up and down the Persian Gulf.
But passion often overrides reason in war. One can hope that both Putin and Trump, or at least the generals that surround them, have read Clausewitz on the matter.
Copyright 2017 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who has written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs.