Brian M Downing
Russia has made important gains in the Muslim world. It has built up its military position in Syria, adding an airfield at Latakia and showing its willingness to back an ally with exceptional force. Iran is more solidly in Moscow’s camp than ever. And longtime enemy Turkey has moved away from NATO, at least partially, and is conducting joint air operations with Russia against ISIL.
The world sees chaos and potential quagmire in Libya. Putin sees opportunity. Libyan militias, with NATO air support, defeated Qaddafi’s forces then fell into a vexing conflict between several militias, including a sizable ISIL force.
Two major factions have emerged: the optimistically named Government of National Accord, which is backed by the UN and based in the west, and a rival group in the east led by warlord Khalifa Haftar.
Russia and the east
General Haftar is an ambitious and adaptable figure. He has served Colonel Qaddafi, an anti-Qaddafi movement, the Central Intelligence Agency (which helped him become an American citizen), and now a governmental council in Tobruk. He has seized a good deal of the country’s oil assets along the coast and deep in the south and southwest. He recently held a videoconference with the Russian defense minister aboard the aircraft carrier Kuznetsov, which was anchored off Tobruk, fresh from its actions in the battle of Aleppo.
Stung by NATO’s ouster of Qaddafi and eager to weaken NATO, Putin is likely to build airbases and port facilities in Haftar’s domain. These would of course complement those already operating at Tartus and Latakia in western Syria.
Russia will help Haftar consolidate his control of a large swath of Libya and participate in reducing ISIL’s position, thereby strengthening Russia’s dubious claim of being in the forefront of the ISIL War. But will Putin and Haftar try to take western Libya, including Tripoli?
Half or whole?
Retaking all of Libya has attractions. It could lead to Russian bases ranging from Syria to the central Mediterranean, perhaps including one near the old American airfield, Wheelus AFB, which was closed down in the early seventies. One day Russian ships and planes may again be seen in Egypt too.
The greater the territory under Haftar’s control, the more oil revenue he will have and the more arms Russia can export to him. Arms exports are critical to compensate for western sanctions and sluggish oil prices.
Taking the whole of Libya is a daunting but doable task. Haftar’s forces are reasonably united and well equipped. The introduction of Russian air support can introduce the same harsh tactics effectively employed on Aleppo – devastating airstrikes followed by relatively easy infantry advances.
Such a campaign will bring the opportunity to further demonstrate the West’s reluctance to use force and to cause divisions within the old alliance. There was a time when western forces would sail boldly into Tripoli and make a stand at Tobruk, but that was long ago, when pirates menaced commerce and Rommel’s panzers drove on Suez. Who in the West now wants to die for Libya, or even get involved in an open-ended proxy war by backing forces whose determination, political orientation, and relationship to Islamism are questionable at best.
There are good reasons for not trying to take all of Libya. Putin has before him the possibility of a working partnership with the Trump administration. Sanctions could be lifted. Oil technology and investment could flow into Trans-Ural and Arctic programs. Too much effort in Libya will alarm most of the military and intelligence figures in the new administration.
If Haftar were successful in taking Tripoli and reaching the Tunisian border, he would be burdened with dealing with various Arab, Berber, and Tuareg groups. Government would be difficult and costly. After all, Libya has never been governed as a unified country – not by Italy, not by the monarchy. Even Qaddafi ruled through his personal magnetism, not national institutions, at least for many years.
Resistance to a single ruler would be protracted and costly. Putin and Haftar will show better judgment by holding to the east and sparsely populated south where there is considerable oil and the potential for less onerous administration.
Getting into Libya brings problems for Putin. Haftar is 73 and transition to new leadership in coming years will be difficult. The territory he now controls could disintegrate into warring factions, leaving Russia with bases on the coast but trouble surrounding them. ISIL may one day hold no territory in Libya, but Islamist militancy has been well entrenched there since Qaddafi’s days when they formed a potent underground movement and their exiles became a large part of bin Laden’s embryonic al Qaeda network. They will remember Syria and welcome the presence of Russian targets along the Mediterranean shore.
Copyright 2017 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who has written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs