Russia looks for opportunities in Iraq
Brian M Downing
Russia and the United States are engaged in Cold War Two – a global contest for influence, trade, military bases, and power. Russia, in conjunction with China, want to establish hegemony in the Eurasian land mass, including the Middle East.
Russia is building up its naval and air bases in Syria, strengthening ties with Iran, and feeling out the Sunni monarchies which are irritated by American calls for political reforms. The impending expulsion of ISIL from major holdings in Iraq will return sectarian and ethnic problems to the fore. The US will try to ease these problems. Russia will try to exploit them.
The US position
Since ISIL swept into northern Iraq in the spring of 2014, sending the fledgling Baghdad army into full flight, the US has sent over 6000 troops back into the country. They train, advise, provide air and artillery support, and handle logistics for the Iraqi troops, Kurdish peshmerga, and Sunni tribal levies that are battling for Mosul. The troops are unified, though only for the time being.
Once Mosul and remaining ISIL positions in Iraq are liberated, the unity will disintegrate and the Kurdish-Arab and Shia-Sunni antagonisms will become serious problems. Antagonisms will be worsened by competing claims for the Mosul victory, recriminations over civilian and military casualties, contestation over territory and oil fields seized by the Kurds in 2014, and by centuries-old accusations of heresy and Persian loyalties.
Russian opportunities
The US is in the middle of the military coalition; the US will be in the middle of the flaring antagonisms. America’s plight, and Russia’s remoteness from the antagonisms, will not go unnoticed in Moscow. Several opportunities will present themselves.
Moscow may support Baghdad against the Kurds and Sunnis. Iran has considerable influence with the Shia and could help its Russian ally detach Iraq, albeit in truncated form, from American influence. Russian trainers and arms may replace American ones.
This would be difficult as the Shia government, under both Maliki and Abadi, have steered a neutral course between the US and Iran, benefitting from both states but aligning with neither. Abadi’s reliance on American military support against ISIL indicates reluctance to move too close to Iran, despite sectarian affinities.
Alignment with Russia and Iran would likely lurch Iraq toward authoritarian government. Although the Baghdad government is no model of democracy and indeed is thoroughly corrupt, it prefers a measure of pluralism that sanctions shared corruption and more importantly, prevents another Saddam Hussein.
A second option for Moscow is to support Moqtada al Sadr, the leader of the Shia militias who fought the US but who have played a significant role in fighting ISIL over the last two years. The Shia cleric is too unstable and unpopular, with the public and religious hierarchy, to form a government. He might, however, be a short-term asset for Moscow – as he is for Tehran.
Third, Moscow could support an independent Kurdistan. The new state will be an important regional power, it is relatively secular, and it will be an avid purchaser of arms for decades to come. Moscow here would be siding with Ankara, with which it has tentative relations, and Tehran, a longstanding ally, both of which support Iraqi Kurds.
The Kurds will not cast their lot with any single power. They will use their geopolitical importance to win support from as many states as possible. The Kurds already have support from Turkey, the US, Israel, and Iran. Russia can only win a secondary or tertiary role.
Fourth, Moscow could champion Sunni autonomy in western Iraq. The Sunni tribes are armed, Shia power is absent in the west, and the example of Kurdistan beckons.
This move would anger both Syria and Iran – Russia’s two chief allies in the Middle East. While a Russian pivot to the Sunnis will come one day, preferably one that is acceptable in both Damascus and Tehran, that day isn’t at hand.
No master stroke for Russia is apparent. Russia’s best bet is to hedge its bets, supporting all groups in the short term, feeling out opportunities with all to weaken the untenable American position of trying to hold Iraq together.
Copyright 2016 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who has written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs.