The battle of Aleppo and the trajectory of the Syrian war
Brian M Downing
A battle for Syria’s once largest city has been coming for several months now. It’s been postponed by short-lived ceasefires but now seems to be on in earnest. The war has seen sectarian slaughter and harsh rule by ISIL. Russian-Syrian airstrikes are now deliberately targeting urban areas of no military significance. Civilian casualties are high, world outrage is not. The grim turn in the war may lead to even greater atrocities as rebel groups strike back, with or without any strategic vision.
Russian-Syrian tactics
Over the years, Damascus has benefited from foreign intervention. Failing fortunes were reversed by Iranian-trained militias, Hisbollah, IRGC units, and most recently by Russian airpower. The government is no longer on the brink of collapse. It’s consolidating a defensible position in the west, and Aleppo is now the prime objective.
Consolidation began in the capital itself where rebels held parts of the city and suburbs. Russia and Syria developed a method to expel them without a ground operation that might cost thousands of casualties: punishing rebel districts with conventional bombs, barrel bombs, artillery, and sometimes poison gas. Medical facilities, relief convoys, and perhaps even water pumping stations are targeted. This isn’t collateral damage from attacks on military targets; it’s a deliberate attack on civilians for a political end. Syria leveled Hama to suppress a Muslim Brotherhood in 1982, Russia did the same to the Chechen capital in 2000.
The aim is to make the districts unlivable and drive a wedge between civilians and rebel fighters. The tactic culminates in offering safe passage out of the targeted district, thereby handing it over to the government – free of rebel fighters, free of resentful civilians. Government casualties are light compared to most urban battles. In the calculus of Damascus and Moscow, world opinion will be critical, widespread, and brief.
Beyond Aleppo
This new tactic has been useful in Damascus and will likely succeed in Aleppo. Unfortunately, it can also be used on smaller towns and villages. Damascus may have dreams of reconquering the entire country, and Tehran may share this belief. Moscow has no such illusion and has signaled it by withdrawing a portion of its fighter aircraft after Assad proclaimed his unrealistic plans. Moscow will limit Assad to a western rump state.
Raqqa, ISIL’s capital in north-central Syria, might be the next major target. Retaking it, however pitilessly, would garner prestige for Damascus and legitimize Moscow’s dubious claim to be leading the war against Islamist militancy.
The US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces could, in part owing to reluctance to level civilian neighborhoods, fail before Raqqa. The US will accept collateral damage on airstrikes directed upon legitimate military targets, but will not match Russia’s ruthlessness. US-backed forces, then, are at a disadvantage to those of Russia – at least from a cold, military perspective.
Escalation of terror
There will be a response from the rebel sides, though. One might be targeting Russian personnel at the Latakia airfield or Tartus naval base. Both, however, are far to the west, away from rebel strongholds, and well protected. But vengeful suicide bombers can defeat the best-laid security. This was demonstrated months ago when a bomb was detonated deep in the government safe zone, killing a number of high-ranking officers.
The US is unlikely to provide Manpads. They would be effective against helicopters but less so against fighter aircraft. Helicopters are slow and low-flying, and are the deliverers of barrel bombs. Fighter aircraft are much faster, fly higher, and do not have to tarry over targets. Saudi Arabia may make good on its offer to deliver Chinese Manpads.
Rebel groups may respond with increased atrocities against government forces and with bombings of Shia civilian targets. Russia itself might be a target, especially by Chechens,
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Aleppo may be a decisive battle if one side suffers a crushing defeat. More likely, it will be a long, savage but inconclusive battle – one that is even more merciless than previous ones in the war.
Copyright 2016 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who has written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs.