The Iranian nuclear agreement, American elections, and Israeli generals

The Iranian nuclear agreement, American elections, and Israeli generals 

Brian M Downing

Last year’s nuclear deal with Iran occasionally appears in the rintresidential campaign. The GOP candidate decries it as one of many mistakes made by his Democratic opponent, who was Secretary of State in the lead-up to the agreement. Never far from the criticism is the charge that the deal compromised Israel’s security and that Iran’s nuclear sites should have been bombed. A reluctant, inexperienced President Obama refused to act firmly and protect the security of the US and a staunch ally.

PM Netanyahu of course was highly critical of the deal, as were many in his government and several generals and security chiefs. Several but not all. Many Israeli generals supported the deal as the best one available. After all, Iran is an unbowed state, not a vanquished foe. Largely unnoticed in the US were Israeli security figures’ criticisms of Netanyahu’s claims about Iran’s nuclear program, the intentions of the mullahs and generals in Tehran, and the advisability of preemptive strikes on Natanz, Fordo, and Parchin.

Several of Netanyahu’s security chiefs composed a stronger obstacle to attacking Iran than the Obama administration did. They played roles in an insurgency that prevented the PM from gaining a consensus for war in the public, the Knesset, and even in the cabinet.

Rationality and deterrence in Tehran 

There are nine countries with nuclear weapons. Each, with the exception North Korea, is thought to be guided by rational assessments of their limited usefulness. If one side were to use nuclear weapons, the other side would retaliate in kind. Both sides would pay fearful and unacceptable costs – mutually assured destruction, as it’s known.

Opponents of the nuclear deal do not think deterrence will hold in Tehran. The leadership is said to be steeped in apocalyptic thinking and irrational calculations. They will welcome a nuclear war, even though it would devastate Iran, because it would signal the return of the occulted Imam who will settle all scores and usher in the new epoch.

Army chief of staff Benny Gantz, while concerned with Islamic fundamentalists and nuclear weapons, stated that Iran’s leadership was “very rational”. He went on to express confidence that international pressure would prelude the need for attacks on the nuclear sites. Events appear to have shown him right.

In a strategically timed appearance on American television, in March 2012, as pressure to attack Iran built in Washington, Meir Dagan said, “The regime in Iran is a very rational one.” He went on to say that then President Ahmadinejad, who was given to outrageous statements but who had no say in military matters, was also rational in his political calculus. Both generals were publicly contradicting their government.

The state of the Iranian program

Over the last few years Netanyahu asserted that Iran’s centrifuges were on the verge of producing enough weapons-grade uranium to produce nuclear weapons. Triggering mechanism and delivery systems were within reach, too. Netanyahu made the claim before the United Nations with a famous visual aid, and repeated it in a hotly contested Knesset campaign early last year. His impassioned calls for the world to act were widely promulgated in the US and Europe.

Less noticed were statements from two generals. Uzi Eilam, a brigadier general and director of Israel’s atomic energy program, argued that Iran was ten years from being able to make a nuclear weapon. He went on to say that it was unclear if Iran’s program had designs to go past “dual use” stages and embark upon a weapons program.

Major general and retired Mossad chief Meir Dagan (1945-2016) once directed a program of assassinating Iranian nuclear scientists, and can hardly be judged a dove. He too had doubts about his PM’s claims. Shortly after Netanyahu made them amid a 2015 election campaign, Dagan, more given to plain speaking than most colleagues, at least in public, called the allegations “bullshit”. Not plausible interpretations of a wealth of intelligence, just “bullshit”.

As for the judiciousness of attacking Iran, several generals noted adverse consequences. Europe would be aghast, especially if energy prices soared, and Europeans would be more open to the BDS campaign. Hisbollah, an Iranian ally, could retaliate with border skirmishes and thousands of missiles, some capable of hitting Haifa and Tel Aviv. The ever-candid Meir Dagan called starting war with Iran, “the stupidest thing I have ever heard”.

Copyright 2016 Brian M Downing

Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who has written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs.