Russia moves even closer to Iran
Brian M Downing
Upheaval in the Middle East has caused great concern in many capitals. Some states see opportunity. Saudi Arabia, for example, has brought Egypt and its formidable army into its sphere, and hopes to do the same with Sunni regions of Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. Russia, too, sees opportunity. It has propped up its Syrian ally by building an airbase in the northern part of the country, from which Russian aircraft have punished rebel positions. In recent weeks Russia has begun expanding the airbase and deploying an S-400 air defense system. Russia has long had a naval base on Syria’s Mediterranean coast.
This week Russia deployed SU-34 fighters and long-range Tu-22M bombers to an airfield near Hamadan, a town in northwestern Iran better known for rugs than strategic value. The aircraft immediately flew across Iraq, presumably with Baghdad’s consent, and struck rebel positions in Syria. This move has little significance for the Syrian war, but intriguing long-term implications for the Gulf region.
Power projection
Flying sorties out of Hamadan demonstrates Russia’s increasing ability to project power in the Middle East. The Tu-22M can deliver ordnance some 1500 miles away, allowing it to strike anywhere in the Persian Gulf, including the Strait of Hormuz. If granted access to airfields in southern Iran, Russian could patrol vast parts of the Arabian Sea, though not as far south as the US base on Diego Garcia.
Russia has already fired Klub cruise missiles onto Syrian rebels from ships in the Caspian Sea. It’s unlikely the missile strikes served any real military purpose. They signaled the US that Russian ship-killing missiles, fired from safe positions, could reach naval vessels in the Gulf and eastern Mediterranean.
Historically, whether under a shah or an ayatollah, Iran has been reluctant to allow foreign military bases on its soil. However, Tehran has elided this policy by designating the presence of Russian bombers as temporary. Many more temporary deployments of uncertain duration can be expected.
Relations with Iran – and with Saudi Arabia
The sight of Russian military personnel on Iranian soil might bring back memories of the Soviet occupation of northern Iran during and after World War Two, which ended only after considerable American pressure. That reaction will be faint at best and confined to the elderly. A more common reaction will be appreciation of foreign assistance in supporting Syria and fighting Sunni extremism.
Iranian Greens will be less appreciative as the bombers do not augur well for better ties with the US. They signal strengthening partnership between authoritarian powers who use military feats to justify firm hands. Calls for reform will strike many of the Greens’ countrymen as ill-timed, unpatriotic, and even seditious. The power of mullahs and generals will be stronger going into next year’s elections.
Riyadh will be displeased to see closer ties between Moscow and Tehran. However, Russian-Saudi relations have warmed in recent weeks and the deployment of combat aircraft to Iran was probably discussed at recent meetings between the two powers’ foreign ministers. Riyadh is thus far quiet on the deployment.
The US
Russian aircraft operating from Iran constitute no threat to US dominance in the Persian Gulf. A handful of aircraft cannot challenge American bases in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the Emirates, Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman, and the one or more carrier battle groups typically inside the Gulf. The Russian move, however, is part of a policy to ease the US out of the strategic waterway in coming years or even decades. The policy will find support from present-day American allies in the region.
Closer ties among Russia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and China are likely. The ties may not be warm, especially between Sunni and Shia countries, but common interests can keep antagonisms in bounds, and growing Russian-Chinese influence in both Riyadh and Tehran will greatly help.
All these countries adamantly oppose democracy and US hegemony in world affairs. China will be the largest purchaser of oil from the Gulf for decades to come. Gulf states can buy reasonably good weaponry from China and Russia and distance themselves from Washington and its continuous criticism of human rights records. Arms, oil, and autocracy may prevail one day.
Washington, naturally, will not want to see its control of the Gulf weaken, let alone be handed over to Moscow and Beijing. Nor will western arms producers want to lose their most avid customers. The coalescence of a Russian-Chinese-Gulf league will be opposed, though not for reasons of oil dependency or well-defined national security.1
1 See “The emerging Eurasian triad and its importance for democracy and world affairs” Downing Reports 16 September 2015.
Copyright 2016 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who has written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs.