Is a Saudi-Russian rapprochement in the works?

Is a Saudi-Russian rapprochement in the works?

Brian M Downing

Russian foreign minister Lavrov and his Saudi counterpart Adel Al-Jubeir met recently and called for cooperation against ISIL and better relations in general. This would represent a return to the portentous dealings that were put on hold when Russia deployed fighter aircraft to defend Assad in Syria – a government that the Saudis have endeavored, through financing rebel groups, to overthrow for five years now.

The view presented here has been that, a quarter century after the Afghan War and the fall of communism, Saudi Arabia and Russia have much in common, and that Russia’s tilt toward Shia Syria would be followed by a rapprochement with the Sunnis.¹

Rapprochement is underway. Both sides have much to gain from greater cooperation. Most of it will come at the expense of the United States.

Syria

Riyadh and Moscow are on opposite sides in the civil war, but the impossibility of either side winning makes cooperation possible. ISIL offers the common ground. Each side will present itself as concerned with defeating ISIL and make at least desultory efforts to coordinate a campaign. Russia has airpower at Latakia and considerable influence over Syrian and aligned ground forces. The Saudis have a handful of aircraft in Turkey but control the finances of large rebel militias.

In that each side has thousands of its subjects fighting with ISIL and Jabhat Fateh al-Sham (the former al Nusrah Front), each wants to see its subjects ground to dust in Syria and Iraq. Better they perish or abandon jihad there than come home to wage war.

Coordination is unlikely in the near future. A major battle is brewing around Aleppo in the north, with each power’s ground forces set for a long, costly effort. Victory will confer the ruins of what was once Syria’s largest city but also a better position in negotiations, where Russia and Saudi Arabia will be major actors. The broad contours of a settlement would feature Saudis’ accepting a Shia rump state in the west, and Russia’s prevailing upon Syria and Iran to accept the coalescence of a Saudi-backed statelet in much of the center and east.

Economic cooperation

Seeking at last to diversify their economy, the Saudis are preparing an ambitious program of industrial development. They will benefit from the advice of Russia on engineering and managerial issues which will not test the relationship between professional middle classes and pressure to democratize. The pursuit of efficiency is less important than the preservation of autocracy. Chinese consultants will be helpful.

An arms industry is a likely part of the economic program, if not its centerpiece. Saudi Arabia could, within a few years, be a significant manufacturer of Kalashnikovs (no engineering marvel here), machine guns, antiaircraft weapons, and light armor. Looking further ahead, ships and aircraft might be made.

The Saudis could become an important arms seller to the Arab world, Pakistan, and African countries. In the meantime, the Saudis and their Gulf allies will purchase more Russian and Chinese armaments.

American oil has wreaked havoc on world oil prices, making the sort of leverage that OPEC had a thing of the past. Nonetheless, Russia and Saudi Arabia are the two largest oil exporters and could one day influence world prices, or at least exert pressure on irritating importers.

Diminishing American power

A rapprochement, should it come and develop into an enduring partnership, will weaken the US position in the Middle East. And of course this is a principal aim of the rapprochement.

With Russia and Saudi Arabia taking the lead in future talks on the Syrian conflict, the US will be in the unfamiliar position of a secondary role. This is unavoidable as influence at the bargaining table comes from the number of beholden troops in the war. Russia and Saudi Arabia have far more than the US, which has failed to build a force.

Saudi reliance on the US for arms and defense comes with continuous pressure for political reform. Though this may have eased for the moment as the Arab Spring brought mostly chaos and war, the Saudis are assured that no such pressure will ever come from a country with a history of strong autocracy. Nor will such pressure come from the chief importer of oil from the Gulf – China. The three powers will constitute a latter-day Concert system that tirelessly aims to keep reform and American meddling from their doorsteps.

The rising importance of Russian arms and other products, and the future of Saudi arms production, will greatly hurt American manufacturers and reduce American influence in the Gulf. Looking further out, closer ties to Russia and larger oil,sales to China will gradually make the region far less the American protectorate that it’s been since World War Two.

Perhaps one day Russian and Chinese ships will tie up in Bahrain, and their planes will range across the Gulf from the Prince Sultan Air Base.

¹ See “The emerging Eurasian triad and its importance for democracy and world affairs,” Downing Reports 16 Sep 2015; “Is Putin’s tilt to Shia states long-term?” Downing Reports 16 Nov 2015.

Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who has written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs.