Obama’s foreign policy and the Nixon Doctrine
Brian M Downing
Politicians and the public at large are voicing frustration at the slow pace of the ISIL War. Some claim the administration doesn’t have a strategy. Many are eager to see more US troops sent back into the Middle East.
Owing to the detachment of the public from military service, most politicians and citizens have little comprehension of military matters. The administration does have a strategy. It doesn’t call for large numbers of American troops on the ground, which to most is the surest sign of a strategy. Their strategy’s origins, if stated publicly, would be rather embarrassing to both the administration and to the party out of power.
The Obama strategy
The president came to office after five years of divisive war in Iraq and many years of Taliban resurgence in Afghanistan. The public was eager to put Iraq behind it and hopeful that something could be salvaged in Afghanistan.
Prior to the 2009 inauguration, the lawfully-elected government of Iraq ordered American troops to leave by the end of 2011. Baghdad allowed US trainers to help rebuild the army and bought US military equipment. In Afghanistan, US troops began to withdraw, and concentrated on training the Afghan army.
The administration shifted the combat burden to indigenous forces. Washington would train them, arm them, and bolster their governments with economic aid – and hope for the best.
Neither training mission has been a shining success. Most units in the Iraqi and Afghan armies are not combat effective. The only reliable units are special forces battalions. These failings are chiefly due to extensive corruption and tribal rivalries rather than to the failings of US cadres (though it remains to be seen how candid reports have been).
Origins
Forty years earlier, Richard Nixon was sworn into the presidency, also amid a long, controversial war. He, in conjunction with his national security adviser, recognized the burden on the military but also the need to keep global commitments. They devised what became known as the Nixon doctrine: the US would provide economic and military aid, as well as training missions, but allies would have to assume the bulk of ground-fighting.
The Obama strategy, then, is essentially derived from the doctrine advanced by Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger. Naturally, the administration is reluctant to defend its strategy by grounding it in the thinking of two figures generally reviled by their side of the political chasm. Similarly, GOP critics would dread acknowledging that the administration’s policy is rooted in the realpolitik of two of its own.
Escalation, despite the doctrine
Enunciating a doctrine doesn’t mean it will be clung to. World events come up hard against even the best thought-out doctrines. Nixon withdrew GIs from Vietnam, rather swiftly, and shifted the burden of combat to S Vietnamese troops. When communist forces began to overwhelm the South in early 1975, the US was unable to respond, as congress had banned further action.
As Iraqi and Afghan troops falter, the Obama administration faces no such opposition – not from congress, not from the public. For better or worse, the president has been free to increase airpower and even to send in ground troops – special forces teams and artillery units. This goes beyond the Doctrine whose name no one wants to mention, and deepens the country in Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan for the foreseeable future.
Copyright 2016 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who has written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs.
regardless of whose policy it was or is, I don’t think the Taliban will quit fighting (with much of the local populations’ at least passive support) as long as we continue to occupy their country and support militarily a corrupt government and police forces that continues to put development funds in private bank accounts. This is especially true in places like Helmand where the farmers (most of the population) have been into cash crop/double crop farming for decades starting with governments that were considered there to help the farmers.
I agree. Once Nixon started to withdraw GIs from Vietnam, Saigon hammered through land reform. The withdrawal of GIs from Afghanistan has had no parallel effect on the Afghan government, which remains as corrupt and inept as ever.
I’m still surprised at the paltriness of the Taliban offensive thus far. They should have been able to launch large, sustained attacks in Helmand, Kunduz, and somewhere in the east. That would have spread the competent ANA units too thin and might lave led to big Taliban gains.