The illusion of a quick win in the ISIL War
Brian M Downing
ISIS is a 10- to 20-year problem; it’s not a two years problem.
– General Ray Odierno
I do think it’s going to be a generational struggle.
– Admiral Sandy Winnefeld
In recent months the US has escalated its commitments to both Syria and Iraq. More advisers, more special forces teams, more 
trainers. American artillery units have been deployed to assist in the battle for Mosul. All this has come at the direction of a president who was once determined to lessen American military involvements around the world, especially in the Middle East.
The administration, and many foreign policy analysts – both in and out of uniform – see the developing battles for Raqqa and Mosul as decisive. Taking the ISIL centers will be like taking Berlin – game, set, and match. This is an illusion that indicates a misconception of the nature of the problem in the Islamic world, and holds the possibility for further problems and commitments.
The push for a quick win
There’s nothing remarkable about presidents changing their positions, even at the expense of campaign promises. Nonetheless, some explanation is called for. Domestic pressure? The American public is concerned with ISIL, but not forcefully so. GOP candidates protest the absence of success, but calls for a more aggressive war have not gotten traction.
More importantly, the US is competing with Russia and Iran for influence in the region. Russia is winning support from Syrian and Turkish Kurds, and Iranian influence is significant in Iraq and Kurdistan. American troops are there to limit Russian and Iranian success almost as much as they are to deal with ISIL. This may explain the Pentagon’s growing support for deeper involvement.
The president is also driven by the quest for a foreign policy accomplishment. His opening to Iran, while portentous, is not widely considered a significant achievement. Retaking Raqqa and Mosul may be trumpeted as a major victory, but it will bring more problems and more commitments.
What will victory bring?
Retaking the two ISIL-held cities will be chiefly symbolic. ISIL can return to the underground movement it was two years ago, especially in Iraq. There are supportive networks offered by Sunni tribes discontent with Shia rule, officers from Saddam’s old army, Ba’ath party cells, and Salafi groups.
Indeed, as Baghdad’s control of the western region continues to be negligible, and the state nears paralysis, ISIL can become a movement devoted to Sunni independence. That is a less inspiring goal than restoring the caliphate, but a more manageable one.
The fall of Raqqa and Mosul will present problems for the US. In Iraq, Sunni-Shia-Kurdish antagonisms will become even more insistent. In Syria, the Kurdish-Arab force known as the Syrian Democratic Forces will no longer be unified. The US will be awkwardly aligned with several antagonistic armies, few of whom share longterm US interests.
ISIL can also reconstitute a center elsewhere, most likely in Libya where government is frail, smuggling channels abound, and western 
targets are at hand. ISIL will also be able to recruit from deeply Islamist youths in Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Morocco, and Europe.
Fixation on ISIL and al Qaeda indicates a limited understanding of the problem. Those organizations can disappear from the scene yet instability and violence will remain. Behind them are millions of disaffected young people who have no futures, only romantic notions of glory in war and death. Many will see defeats at Raqqa and Mosul as signs that Islamist militancy has frightened the West and that the struggle is right, and must be continued.
Advantages of a slow war
The term “war of attrition” immediately beings to mind senseless stalemate and needless casualties. The shadow of the First World War still hangs over the West. An attrition strategy, however, may be the only one available. It may also be useful in weakening the appeal of jihad.
ISIL and AQ have ensconced themselves in parts of the Islamic world where states are weak and armies the same. In many cases, ISIL and AQ have allied with local tribes and peoples, as in Iraq, Libya, and Yemen. Local armies are unable, or unwilling, to fight decisive campaigns that would oust the determined Islamist fighters. They only skirmish intermittently with the Islamists and use their greater numbers to wear them down.
A slow war of attrition in Iraq would avoid the risk of calamitous casualties on the few Iraqi special forces that are willing to fight. It would also erode the attraction of war that drives jihadi recruitment from the immense reservoir of restive youth. War is far more appealing when armies are driving relentlessly ahead and raising their banners over newly conquered lands. It is quite another thing when battle lines 
do not budge and the casualties drag on – for years and years.
A useful if initially repellant analogy is the First World War. In 1914, all Europe was enamored by the idea of war and eager for one of their own. Youths had been steeped in war romance from the Napoleonic Wars and colonial conquests. Men marched off, women and children cheered them on. Four years and countless deaths later, war romance was no longer ablaze, and its relighting in 1939 led to its extinguishment six years later. The Islamic world, it might be reluctantly admitted, must undergo a Somme, Passchendaele, and Verdun before it can reach its Rheims.
This western-front business couldn’t be done again, not for a long time. The young men think they could do it but they couldn’t. They could fight the first Marne again but not this. This took religion and years of plenty and tremendous sureties. . . .
– F Scott Fitzgerald
Copyright 2016 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who has written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs.