Secretary of State Kerry and Foreign Minister Lavrov have come to a tentative agreement on a ceasefire in Syria which will allow humanitarian aid to reach hapless civilians. The timing is unclear, as are the likely effectiveness and duration. Optimism in recent days has faded. Whatever comes of it will shed light on the possibility and consequences of a lasting ceasefire and a negotiated settlement.
Both sides in the conflict – better put, all sides in the conflict – are gearing up for a major battle for Aleppo, the country’s former largest city. A lasting ceasefire is unlikely until the battle is joined and one side gets the upper hand – and greater bargaining power in negotiations. There are other problems.
Rebel factions
Many civil wars are fought by two clearly delineated camps – blue and grey, white and red, parliament and king. The Syrian case, however, has a bewildering array of foreign power proxies, warlord bands, Muslim Brotherhood militias, and the radical Islamists of ISIL and the al Nusra Front.
Recent months have seen a measure of cooperation among the factions. The driving force behind this has been battlefield necessity and pressure from foreign backers. Rebel factions accept the need for cooperation, or a display of it, as useful for the time being. Substantial divisions remain, even outside the two radical Islamist bands.
A lasting ceasefire?
Suppose a ceasefire tied to serious negotiations is worked out by the principals. Further suppose that the government side (army, Hisbollah, IRGC) abide by it. The scenario has almost certainly been thought out in Moscow, Tehran, and Damascus. It should be in other capitals too.
Antagonisms in the rebel groups will remain and inevitably erupt into fighting. Since the Thirty Years’ War, irregular armies in ravaged lands have seized economic assets to pay soldiers and purchase weapons. This is already at work in Syria today and a ceasefire would accelerate it. Oil resources, major crossroads, power plants, border crossings, water assets, and urban areas with extant commerce will be fought over. If there is any upside it may be that people will be considered sources of taxation and recruitment, and no longer as irrelevant bystanders. The struggle to develop from transient armed bands to mini-states will continue, and possibly solidify.
Foreign backers
Turkey, Saudi Arabia, the US, and others will not want the rebel opposition to disintegrate into warring factions, as was the case in Afghanistan after the Russian pullout. Mujahideen commanders seized assets right and left and became warlords of various regions.
A repeat in Syria will lead to a partial victory for the Shias and the possibility of a Shia reconquest of war-weary, devastated mini-states someday. A solidified ISIL-stan will also result.
One foreign response will be to tie economic aid to acceptance of the truce. This too would turn the region into a slew of mini-states, each dependent on different and often antagonistic foreign backers such as Saudi Arabia and the Muslim Brotherhood.
A second foreign response might be to accept the presence of a Shia rump state in the west, and several Sunni mini-states of shifting stability in the center and east, and concentrate on wearing down ISIL-stan with limited available forces.
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The US has failed to build a significant proxy in the Syrian war. The Free Syrian Army is not a major force anymore, the more recent effort to 
train an effective group ended in desertions and sale of equipment to al Qaeda, and the Syrian Democratic Forces comprise an unstable partnership between an Arab visionary, who wants to carve out his own emirate in the Middle East, and Kurdish forces, who have recently turned to Russia for air support.
The US may wish to concentrate on ISIL with whatever resources are available in what used to be Syria and Iraq, and to pursue more fruitful efforts such as helping refugees in Turkey and Jordan. In so doing Washington may be better positioned to being about a settlement someday.
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who has written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs.
Copyright 2016 Brian M Downing