Riyadh has announced it would participate in coalition ground operations in the Syrian civil war. The statement loses boldness when it’s noted that there are no such ground operations in the offing.
The Saudis have accomplished two things with the proclamation. First, they have, to some extent, countered the perception in the West that the Kingdom has done little in the ISIL War. Its large, well-equipped army remains in garrison, its airpower serves in a peripheral war in Yemen. Second, the Saudis have further positioned themselves alongside the US. This will irk Iranian mullahs and generals, and weaken the frail American-Iranian rapprochement.
Riyadh’s seemingly bold words are all the emptier when the frailties of its military are considered. There is, however, the potential of a limited Saudi intervention – one that could worsen sectarian animosities.
The Saudi military
There have been numerous wars in the Middle East since Rommel et al were driven from North Africa. Saudi Arabia, despite being the world’s third largest arms purchaser, has adroitly dodged almost all of them. There have been brief skirmishes with Iran and Yemen over the years, but the Saudi military’s only extended conflict was the first Gulf War (1991). It emerged on the winning side but did not perform well.
Middle Eastern armies have failed to overcome tribal, political, and sectarian differences. Soldiers look to their left and right and see people from other tribes, clans, factions, and sects who are of dubious reliability. Soldiers look above them and see officers who have have attained august rank by favoritism, not professionalism. Soldiers look behind them and wonder if support troops can be trusted to deliver supplies under fire and evacuate the wounded.
The Saudis also worry about Islamist sympathies inside the military. Ideological differences between the Kingdom’s Wahhabist sect and ISIL’s jihadist creed are not wide. Saudi troops and ISIL jihadis might also share contempt for the House of Saud’s decadence and reliance on the US.
The Saudi princes will have to wonder if their army can take months of extended fighting and increasing casualties. Western powers are asking the same questions. Iran as well.
Limited operations
The Saudis may be willing to undertake less risky moves against ISIL in Syria and Iraq. Neither will be embarked upon without assurance of US support in the form of airpower and reaction forces.
First, elite units may strike in ISIL’s rear areas. Such operations have already been done by American special forces. Raids disrupt ISIL’s supply depots, training centers, and command and control. Further, they force ISIL to withdraw experienced fighters from front lines and reposition them to defend the group’s vast through shrinking base areas. ISIL will need every experienced fighter it has for the major battles looming in Reqqa and Mosul.
Second, and more intriguingly, the Saudis may cross into western Iraq. This will open a new front against ISIL – one it will be unable to allocate significant resources to. The Saudis, then, will face little resistance. The Saudis will be welcomed by many of the Sunnis in western Iraq – tribes, former soldiers, and Baathists – who dislike the Shia government in Baghdad about as much as they do the harsh rule of ISIL.
Naturally, this will gravely alarm the Shias of both Iraq and Iran. They will see – quite rightly – the Saudi presence as an important step in the direction of detaching western Iraq from Baghdad. With the Kurdish north all but independent, this will be the death of Iraq. Saudi-Iranian relations being what they are, the move could lead to serious fighting, not in the skies over the Gulf as in the 1980s, but in the expanses of Anbar province.
Copyright 2016 Brian M Downing