Kurdistan, the northern region of Iraq, has been heading toward independence for many years. Thwarted in their statehood effort after World War I, the Kurds are determined not to let today’s opportunity slip away.
After Gulf War I the US and other powers established an aircap over northern Iraq, preventing Baghdad from reasserting its rule there, and establishing de facto autonomy for the Kurds. In Gulf War II the Baghdad government was destroyed and its army was dissolved. Kurdistan today has its own flag, constitution, army, and pipeline system.
President Barzani recently called for a referendum on independence. Though non-binding, it will be a step toward independence. There are serious concerns about the viability of an independent Kurdistan, but in a turbulent region, there are also ways for Kurdistan to make itself indispensable to regional and global powers.
Oil and internal divisions
Kurdistan sits on appreciable oil and gas assets. The government receives export revenue which it strategically disburses to various tribes and factions. This “rentier” form of government is common in the Middle East and constitutes one of the few bases of political stability.
Though fortunate with oil, Kurdistan is landlocked and depends on Turkish pipelines and ports. Iran has offered a similar arrangement. This limits Kurdistan’s foreign policy options, especially toward Turkey and Kurds inside Turkey and Syria who are ill-disposed toward Ankara. Similarly, continued good relations with Iran require caution regarding Kurdish fighters who resist Tehran’s rule.
Despite decades of autonomy and external danger, a unitary state has never emerged. Power is shared by two rivalrous factions. One leans toward Turkey, the other toward what’s left of Iraq. Despite serious threats from ISIL and intermittent ones from Baghdad, Kurdistan’s military remains divided into two command structures.
Though overwhelmingly Sunni, Kurdistan has a Shia minority. The latter have formed, with assistance from Baghdad and Tehran, their own militias. Skirmishes are breaking out between Sunni and Shia Kurds.
Furthermore, there are scores of squabbles over revenue-sharing, arms disbursements, burdens of war, and personal and tribal competition.
The collapse in oil prices calls into question the viability of the rentier-state, in Kurdistan and elsewhere in the world. Holding together disparate tribes and factions is easier when oil is $100 a barrel than when it’s down 70% and expected to remain low for years.
External support
Landlocked countries are usually in geopolitical binds. Not so with Kurdistan. It enjoys support from important foreign powers in the form of military equipment, training missions, and subsidies.
Oil prices are down but foreign operators aren’t capping wells and heading for the border. They still extract revenue from Kurdish wells and those seized from Arab settlers in 2014. Foreign firms convey their interests in Washington, London, and Beijing.
Kurdish troops constitute the most resolute enemies of ISIL in the Middle East, expelling them from the approaches to Arbil and besieging them in Mosul. This makes them attractive to foreign powers, in the ISIL War and as a potential ally in decades and wars to come. Foreign publics admire the grit of Kurdish fighters.
Several states support Kurdistan in order to prevent it from being too close to enemies. For example, Iran does not want a neighbor aligned with the US and Israel, and of course the US and Israel do not want Kurdistan to align with Iran. The checks come in regularly.
Kurdish troops have taken positions on three sides of ISIL-held Mosul. They are doing so not out of sympathy for their former Arab oppressors, or out of a desire to rid the entire region of Islamist militancy. They are seeking to demonstrate their military prowess to foreign powers and to gain a large urban bargaining chip in their quest for independence – daunting though it would be.
Copyright 2016 Brian M Downing