Israel and Iran were once allies, both before and after the 1979 revolution that brought the mullahs to power. Hostility began in the nineties and sharpened as suspicions of an Iranian nuclear weapons program grew over the last decade. The recent agreement has done little to soften things.
The Israeli government opposes rapprochement between the US and Iran, and welcomes Tehran’s growing partnership with Russia against US interests, which limits rapprochement. The partnership has reduced Washington’s interest in restraining Israeli and Sunni campaigns inside Iran – one of which involves the Kurds of northwestern Iran, or Eastern Kurdistan.
Israel and the Kurds
Ties between Israel and the Kurds go back at least to the sixties. Israel supported Iraqi Kurds against Baghdad governments which were part of Arab coalitions opposing, and often warring with, Israel. Support was based in Kurdish parts of Iran, whether a shah or ayatollah was in power.
With the destruction of Saddam Hussein’s military in Gulf War One, and the rise of Iran’s influence in Lebanon, Iranian-Israeli cooperation fell away. Today, Israel supports a low-level insurgency in Iran’s Kurdish region, and does so from Kurdistan which is now all but independent of Baghdad.
Continued enmity between Iran and Israel, and the former’s increased hostility toward the US, make ratcheting up the insurgency in Eastern Kurdistan more likely. Recent articles in The Jerusalem Post seem like foreshadowing.
One article summarizes years of cooperation between Israel and Iran, harmonious coexistence between Jews and Kurds over the centuries, and shared oppression by Arabs. The second article laments the oppression endured by Iranian Kurds and proclaims the coming of a Kurdish state in the region – with the help of Israel. (“Those who face death: The kinship between Kurds and Israelis,” Jan 23, 2016; “Iranian Kurds persecuted, benefiting from Kurdish gains next door,” Jan 21, 2016.)
A greater Kurdistan?
The Kurds are unlikely to unite into a nation state. It is misleading to think of them as a unified people who were once thwarted by European powers at Versailles but who are determined to seize the moment today. Deep divisions exist along linguistic, tribal, sectarian, and political lines.
Even in putatively united Kurdistan (northern Iraq) there are two powerful parties which even in the face of ISIL and Shia militias, squabble over resources and maintain two separate military systems. Sectarianism is surfacing: Shia Kurds skirmish with Sunni cousins.
Kurdistan is unlikely to support an insurrection in Kurdish Iran. Kurdistan is on good terms with Iran, benefits from Iranian arms and trainers, and sees potential in Tehran’s offer to export crude through its pipelines and ports.
The autonomy of Kurdistan and Syrian Kurdish lands (sometimes called “Western Kurdistan”) came less from force of arms than by the collapse of state power in Baghdad and Damascus. Collapse in Tehran was dimly possible with sanctions on, but is exceedingly unlikely now that they’re off.
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An insurrection leading to independence for Eastern Kurdistan is improbable in coming years. Iran’s repressive capacity is strong, outside help isn’t. An upsurge in fighting may be in the offing, but it will only have the effect of angering Tehran, increasing its repression, and worsening relations between Iran and the US. This of course will be welcome in some quarters.
Copyright 2016 Brian M Downing