Notes on Iranian-Saudi hostilities 

Saudi Arabia’s execution of a respected Shia figure has led to outrage in the Shia world and concern in western capitals and human rights organizations. Protesters in Iran, upholding a venerable tradition, attacked and partially burned the Saudi embassy in Tehran. Sunni powers have broken or reduced diplomatic ties with Iran.

The execution came after cautions from Iran and many western countries too. A strong response from Iran must have been expected. The Saudis likely proceeded in order to try to continue Iran’s isolation, especially from the US. Iran will oblige them by cracking down on its Sunnis, possibly putting some to death.

What other consequences will there be?

Proxy wars

Open war between the two Gulf pillars is unlikely. The Saudi army is too weak to face Iran’s, even though IRGC troops in Syria have been unimpressive thus far. More likely are naval and aerial face-offs in the Gulf – perhaps a few brief skirmishes.

Proxy wars already raging in Syria and Yemen are sure to worsen. Preliminary talks on Syria set for late January will be postponed or take place in an atmosphere of mistrust and hostility. Saudis will prefer to further bleed Iran there – and its Russian partners.

Iran will up its aid to Houthi rebels and encourage them to continue cross-border raids and missile launches into the Kingdom. The Saudis will scurry for more foreign troops to support the southern Sunnis, but are unlikely to send their own into combat.

Naturally, the Sunnis will try to draw the US and other western powers onto their side. They purchase immense amounts of western arms, not to make their armies more effective, but to make western powers more beholden to significant sources of foreign income and domestic employment.

Iraq 

The Saudis have refrained from supporting an armed Sunni rebellion against the Shia government in Baghdad, probably out of deference to the US which wants a unified Iraq. Saudi deference may end. Sunni tribes have generally been sitting on the sidelines in the ISIL War, preferring to watch ISIL and Shia troops fight each other.

The Sunnis of Iraq will become willing fighters, and ISIL’s most dreaded enemy, if given weapons, money, and more importantly, support for independence from Baghdad. The US may see some good in this.

Insurgencies

Each Gulf power is vulnerable to domestic unrest. Iran has low-level insurgencies in its Kurdish northwest, Baloch southeast, and Arab west – all supported by Saudi Arabia and Israel. Fighting and bombings may escalate. The US is unlikely to object strenuously to the Kingdom or Israel now that Iran has spurned it and embraced Russia more closely than ever.

Saudi Arabia has a Shia minority in its Eastern Province, center of its oil wealth. They have faced discrimination in employment and education and are deeply resentful of the execution of a revered leader. They are on the verge of civil unrest and may soon receive IRGC support.

ISIL

The prospect of worsening sectarian hostilities in the Kingdom is appealing to ISIL. An outbreak of sectarian fighting meshes well with its vision of a new caliphate arising from the ashes of doddering regimes across the Islamic world. ISIL has a small presence inside Saudi Arabia and has already bombed security forces and Shia mosques.

 

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These conflicts will have ambivalent effects on Saudi Arabia and Iran. Each will garner a measure of patriotic-sectarian support, which in the absence of democratic reforms, they will need.

Conflicts will, however, be expensive, more so in money than in casualties. Iran has a few thousand troops on the lines in Syria and Iraq, the Saudis only a handful of security forces in southern Yemen, far from the fighting. With oil prices at their lowest levels in years, these expenditures may become ruinous for both countries.

^©2016 Brian M Downing