After Vietnam, the American military was scorned, the prospect of another war seemed impossible. Yet since then, the military has become lionized and has fought two wars and numerous smaller actions. Andrew Bacevich – West Pointer, Vietnam veteran, and professor of international studies – attributes this change to the creation of two powerful myths: our military is omnipotent, capable of almost any feat, anyplace; the US has a mission, a sacred one in many quarters, to confront evil and spread our way of life. These myths, he argues, constitutes a new militarism, which he looks upon with considerable dismay, if not consternation.
The bulk of this timely book describes six forces that created these myths. Three are readily recognizable: ”œopportunistic politicians” who lavished money and praise on the military before sending it into small wars around the world; ”œpurveyors of popular culture” who deluded the public with images of quick, clean, and uncomplicated wars; and civilian strategists who wished to restore military power to better play the great game they claim expertise in.
Bacevich praises military leaders, the fourth creator, for rebuilding the armed forces after Vietnam, but faults them for not opposing peace-keeping and nation-building missions they judged unwise. He notes their dilemma: become instruments of dubious internationalist policies, or resist them and risk diminished relevance – and resources. Too many generals chose the former, many too eagerly. Though rarely successful, these missions built faith in military omnipotence and the American mission.
The other two groups, the religious right and the neo-conservatives, are masterfully analyzed. Aghast at the social changes of the 60s, many of which seemed to stem from the antiwar movement, the religious right organized and asserted itself politically. They idealized the military as a fortress of moral and civic virtue, the basis of regenerating the nation and stemming communism. A global evangelical mission pervaded their thinking, too. Unlike other creators of our militarism, fundamentalists are not just sideline cheerleaders. They serve in the military in large numbers, to strengthen it and lead it onward, bringing evangelicalism to previously upper-crust Protestant cadres.
Perhaps Bacevich’s most interesting exposition concerns neo-conservatism, the mysterious brotherhood largely unknown until recently. For neo-cons, WWII and the failures leading to it taught many hard lessons. The moral relativism, self-gratification, and retreat from world affairs of 1920s-Europe allowed Nazism to wreak havoc in the world; the decadence of 1970s-America might allow communism to do the same. Accordingly, neo-cons espoused respect for American values and institutions from the commanding heights of the intellectual world. In newspapers, magazines, and professional journals, they spoke of evil in the world, the inadequacies of diplomacy, and the need of American activism to avert another global disaster. The collapse of the USSR was a major victory, but neo-cons envisioned another mission: to spread democracy around the world, through force if necessary.
Our present wars, Bacevich contends, are not due to greedy oil barons but to greedy consumers, who refused to cut their use of oil despite price shocks and President Carter’s pleading. Strategic planners elevated the Persian Gulf’s importance and markedly raised our military presence there. Though couched in geopolitics and idealism, our policy there is to guarantee comfortable lifestyles at home. However, growing military presence in the Gulf set into motion deep resentments and terrorist attacks, in the region as well as elsewhere, ultimately in New York and Washington – “blowback,” as it’s called.
Bacevich likens militarism to pollution, which, through decades of political bargaining between businesses and the public, has been contained. Neither will be eliminated, only controlled through dialogue. Bacevich proposes an agenda: respect for founding fathers on world affairs, greater Congressional control of war, reduction of oil consumption, reordering armed forces toward national defense (not global policing), linking defense spending to foreign expenditures, more emphasis on diplomacy, altering the military’s caste-like nature, and greater reliance on citizen-soldiers in reserves. Perhaps this powerful book will start, and become part of, that dialogue.
The cover features a young soldier, conveying unmistakable strength and determination. No doubt he will honor his end of the bargain, to fight and even die for us. He looks at us searchingly, perhaps wondering if we are honoring our end or if we even know we have one – to risk soldiers’ lives only when assessment of America’s security deems it necessary, not when swirling myths and orations make it seem desirable or entertaining. The author is certain they deserve better.
©2006 Brian M Downing