The ISIL War après Paris

French military personnel stand next to a transport aircraft in Timbuktu, Mali, Thursday, Jan. 31, 2013. Several days after French special forces parachuted in and liberated this storied city, there is a growing sense of freedom. Though in the houses immediately facing the Islamic tribunal, many of the 8- and 9-year-old girls are still wearing the head covering. (AP Photo/Harouna Traore)

The attacks on the French capital demonstrated ISIL’s ability to reach into Western Europe, if only by inspiring Muslims there to strike. French president Hollande responded swiftly with airstrikes on Raqqa, the ISIL capital. He is eager to find other ways to strike back. Concurrently, voices are again calling for increased US actions, including “boots on the ground” – a buzz-phrase with no precise meaning.

Several options are available to the US, France, and other countries. Few are as easy as those who call for greater action think.

Ground troops

A few voices call for ground troops, presumably western ones, to attack ISIL in Syria and Iraq, putting an end to the group once and for all. Three problems would follow almost immediately.

Western troops would be widely seen in the Middle East as a foreign invasion – another foreign invasion. Longstanding narratives of the West’s desire to subjugate the region and humiliate the religion would be underscored. ISIL, al Qaeda, and kindred groups would benefit from greater recruitment and financial support.

Many rebel forces in Syria would oppose the introduction of western troops. Islamist militancy is not confined to ISIL and the al Nusrah Front. Many rebel groups would redeploy from fighting Syrian government troops and turn against the “crusaders”. This may also be true of Sunni tribal groups in Iraq.

Other rebel groups would be inclined to preserve their strength and sit back as western troops assumed the greater share of fighting and casualties. They would be better positioned to resume fighting later.

Arm local groups

Shifting exclusively to Iraq for the moment, Sunni tribes there have a rather complicated relationship to ISIL. Some support it as a defense from the Shia government in Baghdad. Some fight ISIL from redoubts across Anbar province. Most, however, sit on the sidelines, seeing no incentive to, in effect, fight for a Shia government.

If granted autonomy, the Sunnis would almost certainly wage a fierce war against ISIL, as they did al Qaeda nine years ago. However, they will need a reliable supply of arms and of course those arms will one day ensure that Baghdad is unable to reassert control over the Sunni west.

Arming the Sunnis to fight, then, will lead to the further breakup of Iraq. Kurdistan is inching toward full independence. Much of Anbar is angling for it by fencesitting in regard to ISIL.

Special forces spotters 

One of the reason for the less than spectacular results of the bombing campaign is a shortage of hard intelligence on ground targets. Most fighters return to their bases without dropping their ordnance. Special forces teams, inserted into ISIL-held cities and along supply lines, could greatly increase the number of targets. They could also serve with Kurdish peshmerga, the Iraqi army, and certain rebel groups in Syria, where they more readily reduce ISIL strongpoints with laser-guided munitions.

This of course would expose the special forces to greater risk of casualties. It may be noted that in Gulf War Two American spotters directed airstrikes on Baghdad from the vantage point of city hi-rises.

Commando strikes

The US has already performed two special forces attacks on ISIL positions, one only a few weeks ago which freed a number of hostages. The US sustained its first battle death in the region in several years on the operation.

More such operations could hit behind troops positions, destroy supply depots, and block lines of communication. ISIL will have to allocate more troops to rear areas, reducing frontline strength considerably.

Whose special forces?

Iraq has reasonably competent special forces troops, but they are sorely needed around Ramadi and other fronts. The armies of the Saudis and other Gulf states are of dubious competence and in any case they are preoccupied with the war in Yemen.

Jordan’s military is considered well-trained and featuring good special forces units. After the horrific execution of a Jordanian pilot earlier this year, motivation to use them must have been high. The response came only from the air. Jordan has pockets of ominous Islamist militancy and using troops to attack ISIL positions in Syria might worsen matters.

The obvious – too obvious answer – is that US special forces can/will be used for spotting and commando operations. However, there is now an alternative. France and Britain, angered, eager to hit ISIL hard, and willing to take casualties more so than in years, may step up. In that ISIL has affiliates in N Africa, France and Britain may, at least initially, strike there.

©2015 Brian M Downing