Brian M Downing
A Sunni-Shia conflict has been underway at least since Khomeini took power in Iran in early 1979. Fearing Shia uprisings and Sunni ones as well, Saudi Arabia and its allies formed a league to oppose Iran. They supported Iraq against Iran in the 80s and have aligned with Israel, which supported Iran against Iraq but now sees Iran as a danger.
The Obama administration tried for better relations with Iran but failed, largely because Tehran feared an eventual return of the neoconservatives to power and opted to side with Russia. The Trump administration is in step with the Sunnis and Israel, forming what’s called here the “Entente”. Britain and France are now aboard.
The conflict will reap immense sums of petrodollars for the western powers and apparently will not entail substantial troops commitments from them. Apparently. Nonetheless, the conflict presents risks that should be considered. Wars rarely unfold as expected.
Disruption of oil supplies
Iran is threatening to interdict the flow of oil through the Strait of Hormuz. It may calculate that a sharp rise in world prices will bring widespread discontent with the Entente and hurt Sunni exporters too. Iran can cause trouble in the Strait by means of artillery, airpower, and sea mines. China has built a pipeline stretching from Saudi oil fields on the Persian Gulf to the port of Yanbu on the Red Sea. This will mitigate damage to Riyadh’s revenue.
Iran might have Russian or Chinese anti-ship missiles that go supersonic as they near targets. The US has upgraded its SeaRAM defensive system to deal with the problem, though its effectiveness has not been demonstrated in wartime. The system could be overwhelmed by swarming tactics – firing large volleys at a target. The US hasn’t lost an aircraft carrier since WW2. If Iran sinks or gravely damages one, the White House will not react with forbearance or delay.
Terrorism
Each side may use intelligence services to strike at the other. Most Sunni countries have sizable Shia populations. Some like Bahrain have Shia majorities. Targets may be in the region or in Europe and the US.
Individuals or small cells may act independent of intelligence services. Lone wolves may not favor either side in the conflict. They may see the war as the result of meddlesome foreign powers that have long endeavored to weaken the Islamic world, control its wealth, and humiliate the faithful.
The EU is especially vulnerable to terrorism. Its Muslim populations are poor, aggrieved, packed into housing projects and ghettoes, and already integrated into criminal networks with access to arms. Muslims in the US are more integrated into the middle classes but many nonetheless feel senses of oppression and great-power meddling in homelands.
Instability in Sunni states
The Entente aims to destabilize Iran. Charitably put, it aims to bring liberal reforms, though it’s hard to see the Sunni princes wanting a democratic neighbor that will encourage reform at home. Less charitably, put, the Entente wants Iran to descend into protracted turmoil or even regional fragmentation, leaving the Saudis as masters of the region.
Saudi Arabia, however, is vulnerable to instability amid a long, costly war. The Kingdom has about 4 million Shias concentrated in the oil-rich Eastern Province and along the Yemen border. They are mistrusted and poorly treated. Other opposition comes from many sources: the Muslim Brotherhood’s underground networks, radical Islamists, tribal traditionalists, disenfranchised members of the vast royal family, and mid-range officers resentful of royal patronage in the military and eager to become more than a parade-ground force.
Jarring upheavals can come suddenly and unexpectedly in the Middle East: Iran in 1979, Tunisia and Egypt in 2011, Yemen not long thereafter. The House of Saud’s legitimizing ideologies may be stronger in the palaces than in the streets – or mosques for that matter. The princes in Riyadh may look to foreign powers to maintain order. The US’s willingness to oblige is stronger now than in previous years, but it might revert to form in just a few years.
The position here has long been that Russia is eager to expand its influence in the Kingdom at the expense of the US. Moscow and Riyadh share an interest in keeping oil prices high and democratic forces low. The Saudi princess were outmaneuvered by Russia in Syria where most Saudi-backed rebels are done. However, Putin’s use of relentless airpower on civilians must have had some appeal to them, as did his help with chemical weapons. Obama wouldn’t, Trump might, Putin will.
Copyright 2018 Brian M Downing
Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who has written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Thanks to Susan Ganosellis.