What to expect in the battle for Mosul

What to expect in the battle for Mosul 

Brian M Downing 

The campaign to retake Mosul has been promised for quite some time. Troops have been positioned, supply depots set up, and plans reworked over and over. Many surrounding towns and villages have fallen in referent weeks. Though coordinating the Iraqi army, peshmergas, Shia militias, and foreign advisers has presented formidable difficulties, the assault on ISIL’s prize holding in Iraq is said to be underway.

Pressure to retake Mosul has been mounting. This is understandable given the nature of ISIL and the concern of various powers. It might have made more sense, however, to be more cautious and continue a war of attrition.

A swift campaign

One argument for the immediate launch of the Mosul effort is that it will deliver a serious blow to ISIL, not only on the battlefield but also in recruiting more jihadis. Whether they try to join armed bands in Iraq or Syria or Libya, or are inspired to become lone wolves anywhere in the world, the fall of Mosul will deflate the power prestige that ISIL has created over the last two years.

This isn’t persuasive. The ISIL faithful will see the fall of Mosul as underscoring mythic narratives of weak, decadent Arab rulers who lack support from their own people and need western powers to hold them up against an uprising of the faithful. The fallen of Mosul will be glorified. Their immolation will likely inspire a new cohort of recruits who will seek to take up arms and continue the struggle. War myths, regardless of their accuracy, have inspired young men for millennia; sound political-military analysis barely figures.

Another reason for going for Mosul as soon as possible is that victory will strengthen the government in Baghdad. Abadi’s coalition is frail, perhaps on the verge of collapse. This could lead to disintegration of army and state alike, and perhaps to Iraq’s fragmentation or greater Iranian influence. Retaking Mosul will infuse the government and political system with popular support and legitimacy.

There are problems with this argument, too. So fractious and corrupt is the Iraqi political system, even among Shia parties, that two years ago, as ISIL forces neared Baghdad, politicians were unable to unify or enact badly needed reforms in the army, despite its miserable performance. Victory at Mosul will at best only temporarily strengthen Abadi and his coterie of politicians.

The timing of the Mosul campaign has probably been shaped by American politics as well. A decisive defeat of ISIL prior to the November election would strengthen the Democrats’ claim of having an effective strategy in the ISIL War. Retaking Mosul in coming weeks would undoubtedly have that effect, and almost certainly seal a Clinton win. Nonetheless, an assault on a heavily defended city should not be hastened for domestic reasons.

Reasons for caution

The bulk of the Iraqi army will be assigned secondary roles at best in the Mosul attack. Iraqi special forces, trained by US counterparts, will lead the way. American air support will be at the ready, US spotters will be close by.

Iraqi special forces units have been key to retaking Ramadi and Fallujah, where they took heavy casualties. ISIL has held Mosul for two and a half years and has reportedly built scores of fortifications and minefields. ISIL, backed into a corner and facing destruction consistent with their peculiar theology, will fight for every block. Fighters may believe that they can inflict such heavy casualties that the national army’s reliable units are put out of action and Mosul will remain in their hands. Visionaries may think the path to the caliphate is once again clear. Events might not prove them wrong.

Civilian casualties will be high, if not catastrophic. ISIL will use human shields to counter ground troops and air power. The US will want to avoid the disasters at Kunduz, where a Médecins Sans Frontières hospital was hit with considerable loss of life. The US will also want to avoid comparisons with the inhumane Russian air campaign on Aleppo, and with Saudi blunders in Yemen.

Also consistent with its theology, ISIL could try to slaughter the civilians of Mosul, by fire, sword, and poison gas. ISIL commanders to the west in Raqqa may soon ask, Is Mosul burning?

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There are advantages to a gradual approach. ISIL forces could be ground into ineffectiveness on the open terrain outside Mosul. Insurgencies and special forces teams can continue attacking ISIL leaders inside the city. And ISIL will face continued factionalism and infighting that deplete its ranks and encourage Stalin-like paranoia and purges.

But the assault is imminent. While it’s possible that ISIL is already worn down, and that the fight will be less fierce than expected, in all likelihood the apocalyptic army will once again show the world the effectiveness of its fighters and the pitilessness of its leaders.

Copyright 2016 Brian M Downing

Brian M Downing is a national security analyst who has written for outlets across the political spectrum. He studied at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago, and did post-graduate work at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs.